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BRINGING RELEVANCE BACK TO
CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY
Nathalie Martin*
This Paper was presented at the Seventeenth Annual Emory Bankruptcy
Developments Journal Symposium in February of 2020. Less than a month later,
all or most travel had ceased and many of us began the process of social
distancing and restructuring our lives in the face of the coronavirus. No one
could have predicted this event and its effects on the world are both profound
and unknown. The virus has uncovered or at least highlighted vast inequalities
in our entire economic system, including consumer credit systems. While some
of us lament not being able to see our friends or teach live classes, others wonder
when they will see their next paycheck, how they will pay the rent, or feed their
families.
In light of these events, consumer bankruptcy seems not just irrelevant, but
as some on the panel have suggested, downright ill-equipped to deal with the
critical underlying issues, namely vast systemic economic and other inequalities.
Consumer bankruptcy is at best a Band-Aid loosely adhering to the surface of a
far larger problem. Having said that, the consumer bankruptcy system is still a
pretty good short-term fix for a myriad of financial problems, large and small,
but is a short-term solution at best. Thus, I admit upfront that when I proclaim
consumer bankruptcy’s irrelevance, I simply mean that the system could do a
far greater job meeting the modern consumer’s fundamental financial needs.
Below I try to identify those needs, but none solve the real problems which are
far larger than bankruptcy law can address.
In many ways and for many reasons, consumer bankruptcy has become
virtually irrelevant. Like estranged lovers, consumers and bankruptcy have
moved apart in the forty years since the 1978 Code was enacted. The Bankruptcy
Code (Code) has changed drastically, through a series of amendments, but
particularly the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of
2005 amendments (2005 Amendments). While much has been written about the
game-changing 2005 overhaul in the law, those changes are dwarfed by the
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radical ways in which consumers’ financial lives have changed over the same
forty years.
To start, the wealth and income gaps between rich and poor are the largest
today in history. Since bankruptcy’s primary consumer users are middle class,1
a shrinking middle class means smaller percentages of bankruptcy filers.
America is also more diverse than it was forty years ago. A higher percentage of
Americans are people of color but the wealth and income gaps between people
of color and other Americans are also at all-time highs.2 In short, wages and
wealth are down for many if not most Americans, but even more so for
Americans of color.
While wages and wealth are down, credit and debt are way up.3 Americans
of all races and socio-economics are plied with more credit than one could have
imagined forty years ago. There is more mortgage debt, more credit card debt,
more auto loan debt and exponentially more student loan debt. Indeed, student
loans represent the fastest growing share of consumer debt and now exceed
outstanding credit card or auto loan balances.4 Borrowers owe more than $1
trillion in student loans held or guaranteed by the federal government and about
$165 billion to private student loan lenders.5 As a result, student loan debt is
seen by many as the next big bubble, possibly large enough and precarious
enough to generate the next big global financial crisis.
Debt structures carried by people of color are on average more
disadvantageous than those of other Americans. People of color pay higher
interest rates on mortgages, student loans, and credit cards even when adjusted

1
See TERESA SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE FRAGILE MIDDLE
CLASS 2 (2000).
2
Home ownership, one indicator of wealth, tracks these gaps. People of color are less likely to own a
home than other Americans. As of the fourth quarter of 2019, 73.7% of white Americans owned their home,
compared to 44% of black Americans, and 48.1% of Latinx Americans. Quarterly Residential Vacancies and
Homeownership, Fourth Quarter 2019, U.S. Census Bureau (Apr. 7, 2020), https://www.census.gov/housing/
hvs/files/currenthvspress.pdf.
3
Kimberly Amadeo, Consumer Spending Statistics and Current Trends (Apr. 2, 2020), https://www.
thebalance.com/consumer-spending-trends-and-current-statistics-3305916 (last visited Apr. 10, 2020); Personal
Consumption Expenditures/Gross Domestic Product, FRED ECONOMIC DATA (Apr. 29, 2020), https://fred.
stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=hh3; see also WIKIPEDIA, Consumer Spending, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Consumer_spending (stating that “In 1929, consumer spending was 75% of the nation’s economy. This grew to
83% in 1932, when business spending dropped. Consumer spending dropped to about 50% during World War
II due to large expenditures by the government and lack of consumer products. Consumer spending in the US
rose from about 62% of GDP in 1960, where it stayed until about 1981, and has since risen to 71% in 2013.”).
4
See Doug Rendleman & Scott Weingart, Collection of Student Loans: A Critical Examination, 20
WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 215, 216–17 (2014).
5
Id. at 217.
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for income and creditworthiness.6 Their student loans are also larger than other
Americans’ student loans. This means that debtor-creditor laws have greater
significance and greater impact or people of color than for other Americans.
Additionally, despite the endless credit, people in general are less financially
literate than they were forty years ago, creating a perfect, ever-indebted, storm.
Finally, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) has been dismantled
over the past few years and is no longer policing lending products.7
Consumer bankruptcy has never been a panacea, but it has become even less
useful to consumers. Using data generated before the 2005 Amendments,
Professors Deborah Thorne and Katie Porter showed that one year after filing
for chapter 7, one in four debtors were struggling to pay routine bills, and one in
three faced a financial situation similar to, or worse than, when they filed.8 The
2005 Amendments made consumer bankruptcy far less useful to the average
consumer. The amendments limited the secured debts that could be stripped
down in a chapter 13, attempted to make more debtors file chapter 13 cases
versus chapter 7 cases, and added further costly impediments to filing such as
required financial literacy classes. Prior Code amendments limited the
dischargeability of student loans. There is no doubt that the Code is less
consumer-friendly today than it was prior to 2005.
This Paper presumes that readers want to make bankruptcy more useful for
consumers and for society as a whole. If this is true, we need to ask two
questions: first, what do individual consumers hope to get out of the system, and
second, what does society hope to get out of the system? In other words, what is
it that we expect the system to accomplish and what are its goals? While
consumers may also want other things out of a bankruptcy system, most would
like to discharge as many debts as possible and to keep as much of their property
as possible, including their houses and cars. What society seeks from the system
is more complex, but few would disagree that if we are going to have a consumer
bankruptcy system, it should be useful.
6
See Pamela Foohey, Lender Discrimination, Black Churches, and Bankruptcy, 54 HOUS. L. REV. 1079,
1096–98 (2017); see generally Pamela Foohey, Access to Consumer Bankruptcy, 34 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 341
(2018); Pamela Foohey, Robert M. Lawless, Katherine Porter, & Deborah Thorne, “No Money Down”
Bankruptcy, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 1055 (2017); Andrea Freeman, Racism in the Credit Card Industry, 95 N.C. L.
Rev. 1071, 1073–74 (2017) (showing that credit card companies charge more fees, higher interest rates, and
impose other costly conditions on black and Latinx customers).
7
See infra notes 57–72 and accompanying text.
8
See generally Katherine Porter & Deborah Thorne, The Failure of Bankruptcy’s Fresh Start, 92
CORNELL L. REV. 67 (2006) (A large swath of chapter 7 bankruptcy debtors are no better off a year later. This
article depressed me so much that I switched my research focus from bankruptcy law to consumer law shortly
after reading it.).
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Consumer bankruptcy can be useful again, through Code changes that could
also play a role in stabilizing the economy.9 First, all secured debts could be
subject to strip-down, including home mortgages. This one change could create
more prudence among home lenders and help stabilize the housing market and
the global economy. Second, student loans could also be subject to discharge,
after a few years of payment.10 Finally, consumer debtors should have a more
significant marker of their new fresh start, perhaps a celebration and forgiveness
hearing to usher in his or her new life. All of these changes could support
important societal values, such as education, homeownership, and stable of
neighborhoods and communities. All could help make people happier and
healthier, which would save society money but also create value beyond
economics. Finally, allowing people to be and feel heard, whatever that may
mean in the consumer bankruptcy context, could drastically increase the
relevance of the bankruptcy system without costing much in return.
Part I of this Paper discusses the increase in debt over the last two decades,
the growing wage and income gap, growing debt inequality and race, and the
fall of the CFPB, all justifications for using the bankruptcy system to help
ameliorate these problems. Part II discusses particular ways the Code could be
amended to become more relevant, including allowing all secured debt to be
stripped down and allowing more student loans to be discharged. Part III
discusses the main policy justifications for our consumer bankruptcy system and
suggests a third system modification that would make bankruptcy more relevant
for consumers, namely a hearing or other forum in which consumers could be
publicly forgiven of their debts and perhaps even be heard about their financial
woes through the bankruptcy court system. Every litigant longs to be heard,
perhaps even more so than to win. Providing the ability to be and feel heard in
bankruptcy would serve consumer bankruptcy debtors at little cost to anyone
else.

9
Adam Levitin, Helping Homeowners: Modification of Mortgages in Bankruptcy, 3 HARVARD L. &
POL’Y REV. 1, 9 (Online) (Jan. 19, 2009) [hereinafter Levitin, Helping Homeowners] (available at http://www.
hlpronline.com/Levitin_HLPR_011909.pdf). Again, this is questionable, given that individuals of modest means
play less of a role in fueling the economy than they once did.
10
Another way to increase relevance is to make consumer bankruptcy friendlier to low-income people.
We know that bankruptcy is primarily a middle-class phenomenon, but as the middle class shrinks, so does
consumer bankruptcy’s relevance. To make the system more useful for low-income Americans, the informa
pauperis (free fee) provisions could be expanded, there could be more education to attorneys about how to use
bankruptcy to discharge high-cost credit such as payday and title loans, and more non-profit providers could be
created to do free bankruptcies. While none of this will solve the primary problem faced by those with financial
problems, which is low wages, it will be a step in the direction of creating relevance in our consumer bankruptcy
system.
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None of these suggestions are new, but all are more necessary and relevant
now that debt levels are so high and that wealth and debt gaps are so large, and
now that the CFPB is so disempowered. These suggestions are even more
necessary to Americans of color given that they are more likely to have
predatory home loans and high-cost student loans and given that discrimination
in credit markets persists despite laws against these practices. The bankruptcy
system can be amended to begin to close these gaps and aid in ameliorating these
practices. Whether we make changes such as those suggested here, and by many
others before, will depend upon the kind of nation we want to be, and on the
values we choose to embrace. One of those values could be the value of our
human lives, measured in health, financial stability, equanimity, and well-being.
I.

THE DISCONNECT BETWEEN CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY LAW AND
MODERN CONSUMER CREDIT

Part I discusses modern reasons why we need to amend the Code to be more
helpful to consumers, including the increase in debt over the last two decades,
the growing wage and income gap, growing debt inequality and race, and the
fall of the CFPB.
A. The Rise of the Debt Nation
Overall, Americans are in worse financial shape today than they were in
1978. Every year since 2013, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
Bank has created a Report on the Economic Well-Being of U.S. Households.11
In the last report, economic fragility persisted across the U.S., particularly
related to income and educational attainment as they relate to ethnicity and
race.12 The report showed that, similar to prior reports, an unexpected expense
of $400 would force more than one-third of American adults into a difficult
financial situation and that one quarter of all adults had no retirement savings,
and skipped necessary medical care in 2018 because they could not afford the
cost.13
11
Report on Economic Well-Being of U.S. Households, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS.
(2019),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/2018-report-economic-well-being-us-households201905.pdf.
12
Eric Rosenbaum, Millions of Americans are only $400 Away from Financial Hardship. Here’s Why,
CBNC, (May 23, 2019, 12:47 PM EDT), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/05/23/millions-of-americans-are-only400-away-from-financial-hardship.html.
13
Id. The survey showed that the decade-long economic expansion and the low unemployment has failed
to narrow the persistent economic disparities by race, education, and geography. While nearly eight in ten whites
are at least doing okay financially, two-thirds of blacks and Hispanics reported being “at least doing okay
financially.”
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In August 2007, there was so much credit in our system that it crashed the
entire global economic structure.14 The crash resulted from creditor and investor
greed combined with irrational consumer behavior and government inaction, a
perfect storm.15 In this crisis, the credit gorge was on real estate credit but this is
not the last crash we will see. Today, most defaulted loans are home mortgages.16
Auto loans are the second most common driver of accumulated bad debt, with
credit cards coming in third.17 Finally, student loan debt has quadrupled in the
past three decades. True, more students have gone to college, but comparatively
the person by person cost of an individual education has outpaced all other
consumer cost increases.
Debt reduces spending, particularly when wages are down.18 It has taken a
long time for consumer spending to bounce back after the Great Recession, in
part because millions of people went back to school to find new careers, which
cut down on available income and also resulted in these high student loan debt
amounts. During the crisis, Americans racked up so much still-unpaid mortgage
debt and credit card debt that some say consumer spending may never recover
to pre-recession levels.19 The spending may have slowed but growth in that debt
has not.20
Writing about the 2001 recession in 2004, Professor David Lander explained
that “[c]onsumer spending and borrowing patterns during and after the 2001
recession departed significantly from historic norms. United States households
in 2002 continued to spend and borrow at a record pace even as personal
bankruptcy filings reached record levels.”21 He further noted that according to

14
See Aaron Unterman, Innovative Destruction-Structured Finance and Credit Market Reform in the
Bubble Era, 5 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 53, 53–54 (2009).
15
Id. at 53–54.
16
Tina Rosenberg, Out of Prison, Into a Vicious Circle of Debt, N.Y. TIMES BLOG (June 9, 2011),
https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/06/09/out-of-prison-into-a-vicious-circle-of-debt/.
17
Credit cards in particular are a more dangerous form of loan, as they are often used to pay off other
debts, like auto loans, when people do not have enough money for those payments. Amy Traub and Catherine
Ruetschlin, DEMOS, The Plastic Safety Net: Findings from the 2012 National Survey on Credit Card Debt of
Low- and Middle-Income Households 1, 9 (2012) (Forty percent of low- and middle-income households use
credit cards “to pay for basic living expenses such as rent, mortgage payments, groceries, utilities, or insurance
. . . because they did not have enough money in their checking or savings accounts.”).
18
Amadeo, supra note 3.
19
See Bruce Drake, Fed Report Says Household Borrowing is Rebounding from Great Recession, PEW
RESEARCH CTR. (Feb. 19, 2014), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/02/19/fed-report-says-householdborrowing-is-rebounding-from-great-recession/; see also Paul Taylor et al., A Balance Sheet at 20 Months How
the Great Recession Has Changed Life in America, PEW RESEARCH CTR. 26–30 (June 30, 2010), https://www.
pewsocialtrends.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2010/11/759-recession.pdf.
20
See Paul Taylor et al., supra note 19, at 26–30.
21
David A. Lander, “It ‘is’ The Best of Times, It ‘is’ The Worst of Times”: A Short Essay on Consumer
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the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), a revolution in consumer
lending and a new lending culture has provided consumers much greater access
to credit and banking services than ever before.22 He asked whether the increased
costs of survival forced consumers to use increased access to credit to plug the
holes in their safety net, or whether instead consumers were choosing to
purchase luxuries they cannot afford and ought not to buy. He mostly noted the
astronomical amount of debt.23
Regarding changes since the 1978 Code was enacted, Lander noted that in
the twenty-five years since that Code was enacted, growth in consumer credit in
the United States was staggering:
Consumer debt increased from $288,044 billion to $1,977,824 billion
from 1980 to 2003; revolving consumer debt, which consists mainly
of credit card debt, increased from $58,506 billion to $728,429 billion
in that same period. This explosive growth in consumer credit has had
massive economic and sociological consequences on individual
households, on the health of financial institutions and on the American
economy and American society. These consequences range from
extraordinarily positive to inordinately negative.24

Lander further noted that the elimination of price controls that historically
existed regarding the extension of credit has created profit opportunities for
lenders but has not always been helpful to consumers. Often the resulting
products, which typically are subject to no usury caps, have radically changed
the nature of consumer lending and consumer borrowing by providing an
extraordinary profit opportunity to financial institutions but left consumers with
extremely expensive credit options. 25
Lander eerily portended that “the United States economy and the current
system of consumer lending intentionally put credit in the hands of large
numbers of people who are certain to default,” noting that this was a significant
change from the system as it functioned twenty-five years ago when the 1978
Code was enacted.26 He then discussed the effects of the consumer lending
revolution on the consumer bankruptcy system, suggesting that bankruptcy
policy must be adjusted to provide a partial substitute for the withdrawn
protection in the consumer credit world. While his article is primarily a plea
Bankruptcy after the Revolution, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 201 (2004) (citation omitted).
22
Id. at 201 (citation omitted).
23
Id. at 202.
24
Id. at 202.
25
Id.
26
Id. at 203.
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against the proposed 2005 Amendments, it considered the identical concerns
addressed here, but fifteen years ago. The situation for consumers as a whole,
and particularly for consumers of color, has only gotten worse in those fifteen
years.27
B. The Growing Wage and Income Gap
Income inequality is growing faster in the U.S. than ever before.28 Between
1963 and 2016, families in the bottom ten percent of the wealth distribution went
from having no wealth and no debt to owing an average of $1,000 each.29 Those
in the middle income group more than doubled their wealth, but families in the
top ten percent saw wealth increase sevenfold. In 1963, families near the top had
six times the wealth of families in the middle but by 2016, these top earners had
twelve times the wealth of families in the middle.30 Stated another way, since
the 1980s, the top ten percent has amassed roughly forty-three percent of the
total income and economic growth in our economy.31 Since the Code was
enacted, income inequality has transformed our country from a land of economic
promise to one of diminished opportunity for most Americans.32
The rich are getting richer and the poor, poorer, but people of color in all
income ranges are losing ground more quickly than other Americans.33 Both the
income gap and the wealth gap between black and white Americans has
increased since the Great Recession.34 In 2016, the median income for white
27
See id. at 202. Discussing home mortgage, Lander notes that mortgage debt twenty-five years ago
constituted the overwhelming majority of all consumer debt, due to increasing levels of home ownership, a rise
in home values, low interest rates, and a proliferation in refinancing loans and home equity loans. Id. at 206–07.
28
Urban Institute, Nine Charts about Wealth Inequality in America (Updated) (Oct. 5, 2017), https://apps.
urban.org/features/wealth-inequality-charts/.
29
Id.
30
Id. I hesitate to call them “earners” since most are wealthy due to family money rather than hard work.
31
Liu Baodong, Social Capital, Race, and Income Inequality in the United States, 9 SUSTAINABILITY
248, 1 (2017).
32
See generally RONALD P. FORMISANO, PLUTOCRACY IN AMERICA: HOW INCREASING INEQUALITY
DESTROYS THE MIDDLE CLASS AND EXPLOITS THE POOR (2015).
33
Rodney E. Hero & Morris E. Levy, The Racial Structure of Economic Inequality in the United States:
Understanding Change and Continuity in an Era of “Great Divergence,” 97 SOC. SCI. QUARTERLY 491, 498
(2016).
34
On Views of Race and Inequality, Blacks and Whites Are Worlds Apart, PEW RESEARCH CTR. 4, 21–24
(2016),
https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2016/06/ST_2016.06.27_Race-InequalityFinal.pdf. Professor Robert Manduca tells a slightly more nuanced story. See Robert Manduca, Income
Inequality and the Persistence of Racial Economic Disparities, 5 SOCIOLOGICAL SCI. 182 (2018). According to
Manduca, more than fifty years after the Civil Rights Act, family income disparities between African Americans
and white Americans are not growing but are the same today as they were in 1968. He claims that from 1968 to
2016, these disparities in family income narrowed by almost one-third, but that this relative gain was negated by
changes to the national income distribution that resulted in rapid income growth for the richest and whitest
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Americans was $48,000, while the median income for black Americans was
$31,100, meaning black Americans make about sixty-five percent of what white
Americans make,35 a gap that has remained the same, or worsened, since 1976.36
Income gaps among Hispanics are similar. In 2014, the median income of
households headed by Hispanic Americans was approximately the same as
households headed by black Americans.37 Since 1970, the median income of
households headed by Hispanic Americans has been a little over half of the
median income of households headed by white Americans.38 In 1970, the
median income of households headed by Hispanic Americans was sixty-seven
percent of the median income of white households and in 2014, the median
income of households headed by Hispanic Americans was sixty-one percent of
the median income of white households.39
While income inequality relates to wages, wealth inequality relates to net
worth. Compared to income disparities, racial wealth disparities are far larger
and generationally persistent.40 Black Americans’ net wealth is one-tenth of that
of white Americans, and over recent decades, white families have accumulated
wealth at three times the rate of black families.41 Home ownership is one proxy
for wealth given that the more one has, the more likely one is to own a home.
The racial homeownership gap contributes to the wealth gap because home
ownership often represents the lion’s share of a family’s wealth.42 As of 2014,
seventy-two percent of white Americans owned their home, compared to fortyAmericans. Id. at 182.
35
Rakesh Kochhar & Anthony Cilluffo, Income of Whites, Blacks, Hispanics and Asians in the U.S., 1970
and 2016, PEW RESEARCH CTR., (July 21, 2018), https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2018/07/12/incomes-ofwhites-blacks-hispanics-and-asians-in-the-u-s-1970-and-2016/.
36
On Views of Race and Inequality, Blacks and Whites Are Worlds Apart, PEW RESEARCH CTR., SOCIAL
AND DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS 21 (2016), https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2016/06/
ST_2016.06.27_Race-Inequality-Final.pdf. This is seventy-seven percent.
37
Id. at 21–22.
38
Id.
39
Id. Since 1987, the median income of households headed by Asian Americans has either been the same
or more then the median income of households headed by white Americans. People of color are also more likely,
over all time periods, to be unemployed. Valerie Wilson, State Unemployment by Race and Ethnicity, ECON.
POLICY INST. (May 2019), https://www.epi.org/indicators/state-unemployment-by-race-and-ethnicity/.
40
Darrick Hamilton & Michael Linden, Hidden Rules of Race Are Embedded in the New Tax Law,
ROOSEVELT INST. 1 (2018), https://rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Hidden-Rules-of-Raceand-Trump-Tax-Law.pdf; THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, TOXIC INEQUALITY: HOW AMERICA’S WEALTH GAP DESTROYS
MOBILITY, DEEPENS THE RACIAL DIVIDE, AND THREATENS OUR FUTURE (2017). The reasons for these disparities
in wealth include everything from neighborhoods to employment to tax laws.
41
SHAPIRO, supra note 40.
42
Amy Traub et al., The Racial Wealth Gap: Why Policy Matters, DEMOS 1, 9 (2016), https://www.
demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/RacialWealthGap_2.pdf [hereinafter Traub et al., Racial Wealth Gap].
The report defines the racial wealth gap “as the absolute difference in wealth holdings between the median
household among populations grouped by race or ethnicity.” Id. at 7.
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three of black Americans.43 While the percent of black Americans who own their
home has stayed approximately the same since 1970,44 white American
homeownership increased from sixty-nine percent to seventy-two percent over
the same period.45 As with education, the homeownership gap persists when
adjusted for income levels.46 Sixty-seven percent of upper middle class black
Americans owned their home compared to eighty-four percent of upper middle
class white Americans, and fifty-eight percent of black Americans with college
degrees own their home compared to seventy-six percent of white Americans
with college degrees.47 In summary, income, wealth, and home ownership gaps
persist over all time periods, despite antidiscrimination laws and increased
education levels among people of color. Below we explore why.
C. Growing Debt Inequality and Race
While debt has increased overall in the system, the bottom ninety-five
percent have seen debt increase significantly while income has remained flat.48
More specifically, thirty-five years ago in 1983, the bottom ninety-five percent
had $.62 of debt for every dollar earned. By 2007, this ratio of debt to earnings
had risen to $1.48 of debt for every dollar of earnings.49 Today, in 2019, the debt
levels are higher and growing. While credit is more available to the bottom
ninety-five percent now than ever before, this debt is also being used to try to
close the wealth gap.50 High debt levels among the general population
exacerbate the wealth gap, but also have implications for the overall economy.
The only times we have seen this level of debt in our economy were just before
the Great Depression and just before the Great Recession.51

43
Id. The report found that as of 2011, seventy-three percent of white families owned their home, fortyfive percent of black families owned their home, and forty-seven percent of Latino families owned their home.
Id. at 9.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id. A gap between white American homeownership and Hispanic homeownership also exists. In 2014,
forty-five percent of Hispanic Americans owned their home.
48
Tami Lubby, Debt Inequality is the New Income Inequality, CNN MONEY (May 2, 2012),
https://money.cnn.com/2012/05/02/news/economy/income-debt-inequality/index.htm.
49
Id. The top five percent of earners saw the opposite phenomenon. This cohort’s debt was $.76 per dollar
of earnings in 1983, but just $.64 per dollar in 2007. Id.
50
Id. According to Robert Reich, former labor secretary under President Clinton and an author who writes
about income inequality, “as their wages have dropped, some Americans were forced to take on more debt just
to stay in place . . . .” Id.
51
Id.
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On an individual basis, a steady diet of the most expensive forms of credit
can create an unsurmountable barrier to wealth creation.52 Credit terms for
people of color are worse than for white people, even when controlling for
income. Part of the reason ethnic minorities were so hard hit by the Great
Recession was because of the type of debt many carry. Many are unbanked,
which creates less opportunities to build wealth, as well as fewer opportunities
to borrow money at competitive rates.53 Many minorities also face racial
discrimination in credit markets54 and are more likely than white people to think
lenders have their best interests in mind.55
D. The Fall of the CFPB
While debt has grown and made debt relief more necessary, policing credit
products has become a thing of the past, at least on a national level. As it stands,
in 2020, the CFPB is no longer in the enforcement business. Although CFPB
successfully brought steady enforcement actions during the Obama
Administration, the CFPB has slowed its enforcement in every part of the credit
world under the Trump Administration, in monthly rate of actions, industry type,
and settlement or penalty amounts, all in direct contradiction to then-presidential
candidate Trump’s promises to crack down on Wall Street in favor of the middle
class.56
For example, under Director Richard Cordray, the CFPB recovered $12
billion in financial relief for consumers.57 Mr. Cordray’s CFPB averaged 3.2
52

Id.
Michelle Maroto, Growing Farther Apart: Racial and Ethnic Inequality in Household Wealth Across
the Distribution, 3 SOCIOLOGICAL SCI. 801, 804 (2016).
54
Even in 2020, even middle- and higher-income minority populations still deal with racism and
discrimination in credit markets, which affects the credit rates for which they qualify. Professor Andrea Freeman
has shown that, unrelated to risk, credit card companies charge more fees, higher interest rates, and other
conditions on black and Latino customers. Andrea Freeman, Racism in the Credit Card Industry, 195 N. C. L.
REV. 1071, 1098–1102 (2017).
55
Elizabeth Warren & Oren Bar-Gill, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 132 (2008), stating
that:
53

[t]he 2002 Fannie Mae National Housing Survey found that over half of all African-American
and Hispanic borrowers erroneously believed that lenders are required by law to provide the best
possible loan rates. They might know that they did not fully understand mortgage rates, but their
misplaced trust in lenders and mortgage brokers gave them false confidence that their lack of
knowledge did not harm them. In such cases, market imperfections are magnified.
56
See Collin Gillespie, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau is Failing, draft on file with author
(citing Presidential Candidate Donald Trump, Campaign Speech in Ottumwa, Iowa (Jan. 9, 2016) (“I’m not
gonna let Wall Street get away with murder . . . .”)).
57
See Collin Gillespie, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau is Failing, draft on file with author
(citing CFPB Director Richard Corday, Prepared Remarks at the National Community Reinvestment Coalition
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cases per month over his five-year directorship,58 and these actions led to an
average return of $43 million in restitution to consumers per week.59 Under
Director Mick Mulvaney, this figure declined to $6.4 million per week.60 When
Mr. Mulvaney became director of the CFPB, his organization brought only one
case in his first four months.61 Although the case was against one of the biggest
banks in the country, Wells Fargo, the enforcement action was largely seen as
unavoidable as President Trump had previously tweeted his outrage upon
learning about Wells Fargo’s various infractions.62 Under the agreement
between the CFPB and Wells Fargo, consumers did not see a dime returned to
them unless they were individually able to prove direct financial harm to the
dollar.63
Additionally, many of the types of enforcement actions brought during the
Obama Administration have simply stopped under the Trump Administration.
Student loan lending abuses have fallen from a total of fifteen cases securing
$47.5 million in restitution under Director Cordray to zero cases under
Mulvaney.64 Equal Opportunity Credit Reporting Act cases, which are designed
to prevent discrimination in connection with lending, has similarly fallen from
over half a billion dollars over eleven cases to zero dollars from zero cases.65
This decline has continued under the new leadership of Director Kathleen
Kraninger. The CFPB has averaged one case per month under Director
Kraninger and the weekly return in restitution to the consumer under Kraninger
has fallen to all-time low of $925,000 per week.66 There have been no
enforcement actions taken against the large banks or credit card companies.

Conference (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/prepared-remarks-cfpbdirectorrichard-cordray-national-community-reinvestment-coalition-conference/).
58
See Collin Gillespie, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau is Failing, draft on file with author
(citing Jesse Eisinger, The CFPB’s Declaration of Independence, PROPUBLICA (Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.
propublica.org/article/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-declaration-of-dependence).
59
See Collin Gillespie, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau is Failing, draft on file with author
(citing Christopher L. Peterson et al., Response Regarding Bureau Enforcement Processes (Docket No. CFPB2018-0003) (2018)).
60
Peterson, supra note 59, at 5.
61
Id.
62
See Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Dec. 8, 2017, 7:18 AM), https://twitter.com/
realDonaldTrump/status/939152197090148352.
63
See id. (citing Mick Mulvaney’s Wells Fargo Settlement Lets the Bank Decide How Consumers Are
Paid Back, THE INTERCEPT (Apr. 26, 2018), https://theintercept.com/2018/04/26/wells-fargo-cfpb-mick-mulvaney/
(last accessed Nov. 25, 2019)).
64
See Collin Gillespie, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau is Failing, draft on file with author
(citing Peterson, supra note 59).
65
Id.
66
Id.
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Instead, the CFPB has concentrated on a handful of small payday loan
companies, student loan servicers, and illegal debt collectors, with the lone
exception of the credit reporting company, Equifax.67 The Equifax case, like the
Wells Fargo case, was too large to ignore once in the public eye and that one
very public enforcement action alone is responsible for eighty-five percent of
the financial relief secured on behalf of consumers under Kraninger’s watch, a
total of $674 million.68 Although Kraninger has brought three enforcement
actions in connection with deceptive or misleading practices, the Director settled
each case without any monetary restitution, in contrast to Cordray, who secured
$94 million per case over a total of 116 cases.69 Overall, the number of cases
announced in 2018 was down eighty percent from its all-time high in 2015.70
Additionally, the average amount per case returned to consumers is down
ninety-six percent.71 Now more than ever, consumers need the CFPB’s help.
II. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO BANKRUPTCY IRRELEVANCE
Moving now to how bankruptcy might assist with these racial inequities,
scholars have suggested promising ways to make consumer bankruptcy more
relevant. For example, as a solution to the fact that consumer bankruptcy was
losing its relevance even twenty-five years ago, David Lander offered the
following suggestions prior to the enactment of the 2005 Amendments and prior
to the Great Recession:
1.

2.
3.

4.

Regulate sub-prime lending in order to establish an upper limit on
the cost of credit and restrictions or prohibitions on the most
nefarious lending products and practices;
Provide a floor on exemptions;
Implement and evaluate kindergarten through college and adult
financial literacy programs, as well as savings incentive programs
such as the individual development account;
If the recent spate of home equity withdrawals results in a cycle of
massive home foreclosures that current Chapter 13 cannot
ameliorate, amend the Bankruptcy Code to help forestall the tragedy
caused by such massive foreclosures; and

67
See Collin Gillespie, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau is Failing, draft on file with author;
see also data publicly available at the CFPB’s official website, https://www.consumerfinance.gov.
68
Id.
69
See id. (citing Peterson, supra note 59).
70
See id. (citing Peterson, supra note 59).
71
Id.
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Withstand the current pressure to make bankruptcy more restrictive
and leave the consumer provisions of the Code alone.72

While we know Lander’s fifth suggestion fell on deaf ears, and that suggestions
one and four might have helped stave off the foreclosure crisis to some degree,
it is time to revisit these and other solutions.73 Around the same time, Professor
David Skeel suggested allowing the strip down of home mortgages, primarily to
address racial inequalities in credit systems.74 Katie Porter and Deborah Thorne
call for replacement of the means test, job training, broadened unemployment
benefits, better insurance, health care, social programs that encourage savings,
and early financial literacy training, which are all also excellent solutions.75
In Part II, I focus on two changes that would appear to have the biggest
impact on improving consumer financial health, particularly the financial health
of consumers of color, who have fallen even further behind economically in the
past four decades. First, allowing the strip down of all secured debt in chapter
13, and second, allowing for the discharge of all student loans. While these
suggestions are not new, the rationales for them have become stronger over the
past decade.
72

Lander, supra note 21, at 217–18.
Everyone knows the 2005 Amendments increased consumer costs to file for bankruptcy. Lander notes
that if the costs of bankruptcy increase, which they have under the 2005 Amendments, fewer will file. Id. at 217.
Collections will intensify and debtors might jeopardize her home or car as a result of trying to pay her unsecured
creditors in full. Consumers may never file at all, and there may be an:
73

uptick in collections and a significant increase in stress, family violence, mental illness, divorce
and suicide. If we assume that many borrowers are making unwise decisions, then it is possible
that in the long run, in the face of a higher bankruptcy bar, with better education they will make
wiser decisions and borrow less. If we assume that most consumers get in trouble without making
unwise decisions, then they will continue to borrow at about the same rate.
If the bar to filing bankruptcy is lowered, then marginal potential debtors will opt into bankruptcy
and debts that may have been uncollectible as well as debts that might have been collectible will
be written off officially. The set of those borrowers that would file if it were easier but not if it
were harder are likely to be difficult candidates for collection even if they do not file. The battle
between the most credit risky borrower and her creditors (or the purchasers of her debt) is a saga
of calls, letters, and sometimes lawsuits, judgments and collection efforts. The stronger the case
for bankruptcy the less leverage the collector has.
Id.
74
David A. Skeel, Jr., Racial Dimensions of Credit and Bankruptcy, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1694, 1723
(2004). In 2004, legal historian David Skeel explored the racial dimensions of credit and bankruptcy in
Philadelphia, and credit bankruptcy and race in general from the 1800s to the present. He describes the legal
practice of two prominent Black Philadelphia lawyers in the mid-1900s, noting that bankruptcy was not part of
their legal practice. He chronicles the importance of social capital in obtaining credit, which was true for all
Americans but particularly for middle class black Americans, and ultimately discusses the ways in which the
black community ends up taking out less desirable credit. Id. at 1713–14.
75
Porter & Thorne, supra note 8, at 118–121.
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A. Allow all Secured Debt to Be Stripped Down in Chapter 13
Since homes and cars are typically a consumer’s most valuable assets, and
since keeping these assets could make the difference between working and not
working, and living in a home versus experiencing homelessness, allowing
consumers to more easily save these assets could greatly increase their quality
of life and thus improve society. It also does not appear that mortgage and auto
loan pricing are sensitive to possible bankruptcy losses, meaning that while
borrowers would benefit, lenders would not suffer in a way they themselves
deem financially meaningful. 76
1. Allowing Strip Down of Home Mortgages in Chapter 13
In the mortgage arena, ethnic minorities are more likely to carry subprime
mortgages even when they qualify for better ones.77 For example, black
American and Latino borrowers are five times more likely to take out highinterest (sub-prime) mortgage loans than white people.78 Stated differently, in
2002, over forty percent of subprime purchase mortgages and twenty-five
percent of refinanced loans went to black Americans, despite that they made up
just thirteen percent of the population.79 These statistics were from before the
Great Recession.
Once subprime lending practices were in full swing, even higher percentages
of high-interest mortgage loans went to minorities.80 In terms of the mechanics
of how this happened, Chris Odinet explains it well in his book, Foreclosed.81
Wells Fargo and other lenders targeted black borrowers for refinancing.82
Lenders referred to subprime loans made in minority communities as “ghetto
loans” and to borrowers as mud people, people who do not pay their bills, and
76
This would also make life simpler for bankruptcy attorneys and cheaper for bankruptcy debtors. I
noticed the complexity of all these different strip down rules in my introductory bankruptcy class this semester,
which creates a perverse system in which chapter 13 becomes more complex on this issue than chapter 11. While
strip down was once a major feature of chapter 13, with all the current exceptions it is far less important.
77
Maroto, supra note 53, at 804; see also Warren & Bar-Gill, supra note 55, at 66 (noting that “minority
borrowers are incurring prices on their loans that are higher than is warranted by their credit characteristics.”).
78
Creola Johnson, The Magic of Groups Identity: How Predatory Lenders Use Minorities to Target
Communities of Color, 17 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 165, 178 (2010).
79
Id.; see also The Black Population in the United States: March 2002, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2003),
https://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/p20-541.pdf.
80
Johnson, supra note 78, at 177; see also Abbye Atkinson, Modifying Mortgage Discrimination in
Consumer Bankruptcy, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 1041, 1044 (2015) [hereinafter Atkinson, Modifying Mortgage
Discrimination].
81
CHRISTOPHER ODINET, FORECLOSED: MORTGAGE SERVING AND THE HIDDEN ARCHITECTURE OF
HOMEOWNERSHIP IN AMERICA 21 (2019).
82
Id.
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people with bad credit.83 Some lenders targeted religious borrowers by holding
events at black churches.84
By the time the financial crisis hit in 2008, fifty percent of all loans made to
black borrowers were subprime and black borrowers were 2.4 times as likely as
white people to be in a subprime loan,85 despite how many qualified for less
expensive loans.86 The negative effects of the crisis on acquired wealth fell
disproportionately on families of color.87 While the average white family saw an
eleven percent drop in wealth as a result of the crisis, in the same period black
families saw wealth decline by thirty-one percent and Hispanic families, by
forty-five percent.88 In short, persons of color suffered more and not by a small
margin.
The foreclosure crisis crushed the entire economy, but also upset hundreds
of thousands of individual lives, upending entire communities and disrupting
friendships, religious congregations, schools, childcare, medical care,
transportation, and even employment.89
Following the 2008 financial crisis, it became clear that lenders had become
less careful, if not downright reckless, in their freewheeling lending. Some
specifically targeted the poor with high-interest loans. Indeed, the Dodd Frank
Act and the resulting CFPB were created and implemented in large part to
correct what went wrong in the financial crisis.90 While it was clear following
the crisis that much greater care more and diligent underwriting was needed to
avoid another crisis, very little actually changed.91
Moreover, non-banks or shadow banks, such as many mortgage servicers,
are not well regulated yet and are servicing more and more mortgages.92 Shadow
banks escape most forms of consumer protections, including the Truth in
Lending Act, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and pretty much every law
that protects consumers. Shortly after Dodd-Frank was passed, shadow banks

83

Id.
Id.
85
Id. at 22.
86
Id.
87
Id. at 37.
88
Id.
89
Adam Levitin, Resolving the Foreclosure Crisis: Modification of Mortgages in Bankruptcy, 2009 WIS.
L. REV. 565, 569 (2009) [hereinafter Levitin, Resolving the Foreclosure Crisis].
90
Creating the Consumer Bureau, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/
about-us/the-bureau/creatingthebureau/ (last visited Dec. 12, 2019).
91
ODINET, supra note 81, at 158.
92
Id. at 7–8, 123–26.
84
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held just 6.8% of the mortgage servicing rights in the United States.93 The other
93.4% of mortgages were serviced by banks. By 2015, this percentage had
increased to about twenty-five percent with some estimates as high as thirty-one
percent of all mortgages.94 Shadow banks also are not required to retain reserves
for their future obligations and most non-bank servicers are still
undercapitalized.95 These firms are on no way ready to deal with another
downturn. If we have one, things will likely roll out in exactly the same way.96
The vulnerability of the economy and of borrowers remain. 97 Moreover, in the
past, the CFPB did crack down on failures to properly underwrite mortgage
loans but is no longer doing so, leaving the economy vulnerable to another
financial crisis similar to the one experienced ten years ago.
When the 1978 Code was enacted, it allowed debtors to strip down secured
debts that were in amounts greater than the value of the collateral in a chapter
13. This ability remains part of the Code today and is consistent with the reality
that under a state court execution, lenders only recover the value of their
collateral and are unsecured creditors as to any remaining debt. The protection
given to home mortgages in bankruptcy is unique. While debtors can modify all
other types of debts in bankruptcy, by reducing interest rates, stretching out loan
terms, changing amortization schedules, and limiting secured claims to the value
of collateral, the Code forbids the modification of mortgage loans secured solely
by the debtor’s principal residence.98
The drafters excepted home mortgages from the strip down provisions,
requiring chapter 13 debtors to pay their entire mortgage regardless of the value
of the home collateral.99

93

Id. at 8.
Indeed, among the mostly subprime, private label mortgages, shadow banks service an alarming
seventy-four percent of loans. Id. This means that banks are slowly moving their mortgage servicing off-site.
This makes some degree of economic sense. Banks are more heavily regulated and thus it is more costly for
them to service loans than for unregulated servicers. Id. It does however leave us vulnerable to another crisis
unless servicers become more regulated.
95
Id. at 122–23.
96
Nathalie Martin, Future Financial Crisis Not Foreclosed: Book Review of FORECLOSED: MORTGAGE
SERVICING AND THE HIDDEN ARCHITECTURE OF HOMEOWNERSHIP IN AMERICA, 28 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. 329, 332
(2019).
97
Id.
98
Levitin, Resolving the Foreclosure Crisis, supra note 89, at 571; 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(b)(2), 1123(b)(5)
(2019).
99
§§ 1322(b)(2), 1123(b)(5). For most of my life as a bankruptcy attorney, this provision was of little
consequence. Borrowers were required to put down at least ten percent and often twenty percent of their purchase
price, creating immediate equity. Moreover, real estate values generally went up, rarely down.
94
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The presumptive reason for the exception to the strip down rule was that
home lenders provided a valuable service to society and deserved special
protection. More specially, as explained by Chief Justice Stevens in 1993,
“favorable treatment of residential mortgagees was intended to encourage the
flow of capital into the home lending market.”100
There also may have been a sense that if a large number of bankruptcy
debtors stripped down their mortgages, this could destabilize the home lending
market and perhaps the economy as a whole. Without question, one fear was that
lending might dry up for some, due to the possibility of being stripped down in
bankruptcy.101
As chronicled by Professor Adam Levitin, the anti-strip down provision was
a compromise between House and Senate bills. The House bill, H.R. 8200,
permitted modification of all secured claims, but the Senate bill, S.B. 2266, did
not. The bills were reconciled through a series of floor amendments, which
resulted in a ban on modification of loans secured solely by the debtor’s
principal residence.102
There was no discussion on the issue in the Congressional Record, and the
one conversation about this issue sheds little light on this provision’s real
purpose.103 One insurance industry person noted that allowing strip down could
cause residential lenders to be “extraordinarily conservative in making loans in
cases where the general financial resources of the individual borrower are not
particularly strong.”104 Being conservative in lending was mentioned several
times in the discussion but as Professor Levitin notes, there was no evidence in
the legislative history that section 1322(b)(2) was intended to lower the cost of
mortgage credit or increase its availability.105 The provision disallowing strip
down of home mortgages was just a compromise that gave a subset of mortgage
lenders a more favorable position relative to other creditors than they had under
the 1898 Act.106
100

Nobelman v. Am. Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 332 (1993) (Stevens, J., concurring).
See Skeel, supra note 74, at 1710–1711. Skeel explains that if strip down was permitted, there was a
fear that lenders would have to pass their losses on to the next round of borrowers, which would reduce access
to credit for future borrow.
102
Levitin, Resolving the Foreclosure Crisis, supra note 89, at 573–76.
103
Id. at 573–74. This conversation was between Edward J. Kulik, Senior Vice President, Real Estate
Division, Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co., his counsel, Robert E. O’Malley, of Covington & Burling;
and Senator Dennis DiConcini (D-Ariz.) Id. at 573–74.
104
Id. (comments of Edward J. Kulik, Senior Vice President, Real Estate Division, Massachusetts Mutual
Life Insurance Co.).
105
Id. at 615–16.
106
Id. at 573–74.
101
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The issue of lender losses, however, seems to be a nonissue. Through
empirical data, Professor Levitin shows that lenders actually incur greater losses
on a greater percentage of mortgages in foreclosure than they would in a chapter
13 strip down and that that mortgage markets are indifferent to strip down risk
because the number of mortgages that could be modified at any given time is
small in magnitude.107 Even in the worst real estate markets, and Professor
Levitin studied one of them in Riverside, California, mortgage lenders would
not be exposed to substantial losses as a result of strip down.108 The resulting
losses would be too inconsequential for lenders to care about, and are in any case
not figured into pricing models. 109
Turning to the stability of the economy, Professor Levitin argues that
allowing strip down could provide an effective, fair, immediate, and taxpayercost-free tool for resolving the home mortgage crisis.110 He notes that lenders
foreclosed even when doing so was financially harmful to them, primarily
because of contractual impediments, agency costs, practical impediments, and
other transaction costs. Permitting bankruptcy modification, on the other hand,
would give homeowners the option to force a workout of the mortgage, subject
to the limitations provided by the Code, and would encourage voluntary
modifications, as mortgage lenders would prefer to exercise more control over
the shape of the modification.111 This would help foster voluntary, private
solutions to the mortgage crisis. Moreover, this solution is immediately
available.112 As we know, the HOPE for Homeowners Program, the Making
Home Affordable Plan, and the other programs designed to stem the tide
failed.113
107
108
109

Id. at 611.
Id. at 611–16.
Levitin further explains that:
[T]he key to explaining the mortgage market’s relative insensitivity to bankruptcy-modification
risk lies in mortgage-market sensitivity to foreclosure costs. The market’s indifference to
bankruptcy-modification risk is because losses due to modification (including strip-down) would
generally be smaller than those incurred in foreclosure. There is no reason for the market to price
against bankruptcy modification if bankruptcy modification would result in smaller losses than
foreclosure. Instead, modification (be it voluntary or in bankruptcy) represents the best realistic
outcome for a defaulted loan. Moreover, bankruptcy-modification risk is small in likelihood and
magnitude relative to all the other risk factors that determine mortgage interest rates above the
cost of funds.

Id. at 617–18.
110
Id. at 576.
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Susan E. Hauser, Cutting the Gordian Knot: The Case for Allowing Modification of Home Mortgages
in Bankruptcy, 5 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 207, 208–09 (2010).
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Virtually all of the original rationales for not allowing strip down suggest
that, given what has changed in credit markets, we should instead allow strip
down. First, as to macro-economic concerns, we need to find a way to make
lending more responsible. Everything that has been tried has failed to change the
fact that risky loans still occur. Despite Dodd-Frank, lending standards have
eased almost to their pre-crisis levels. In other words, we could be heading for
another crisis. Assuming that markets respond at all to bankruptcy debtors’
ability to strip down, allowing strip down could help our economy. Bankruptcy
modification could force lenders to internalize the costs of making poor lending
decisions through limited recoveries.114 One fear in disallowing strip down was
that it could dry up lending, which at this point could be a good thing. If it had
any effect at all, it would be to dry up lending on risker loans, the very loans that
crashed the economy the last time. Allowing strip down could encourage lenders
to make safer loans and to do a better job of underwriting the risk.
Finally, allowing modification would correct two particular problems from
the last financial crisis, “payment-reset shock from resetting adjustable rate
mortgages (ARMs), and negative equity from rapidly depreciating home prices
. . . .”115 This in turn would help stabilize the housing market. As Professor
Levitin argues, making bankruptcy a forum for distressed homeowners to
restructure their mortgage debts is both the most moderate and the best method
for resolving the foreclosure crisis and stabilizing mortgage markets.116
For many of these reasons, scholars have suggested we allow home
mortgage strip down and many bills have been drafted and have failed117 but
might succeed now. We have no CFPB enforcement. We have more mortgage

114

Levitin, Helping Homeowners, supra note 9, at 7.
Levitin, Resolving the Foreclosure Crisis, supra note 89, at 648.
116
One added benefit of this solution is that windfalls would not go to housing speculators and second
home purchasers because modification could only happen in the context of a chapter 13 repayment plan. Levitin,
Helping Homeowners, supra note 9, at 7.
117
Levitin, Resolving the Foreclosure Crisis, supra note 89, at 649–50, stating that:
115

At the time this Article went to press, Congress was considering legislation to permit modification
of single-family, principal-residence mortgages in chapter 13 bankruptcy. On March 5, 2009, the
Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009 passed the House of Representatives; a
companion bill, the Helping Families Save Their Homes in Bankruptcy Act of 2009 is still in
committee in the Senate. The Obama administration has endorsed bankruptcy modification with
some qualifications, but it is uncertain whether the legislation will gain the requisite support to
pass the Senate absent compromises that would seriously reduce its effectiveness for dealing with
the foreclosure crisis; in 2008 similar legislation passed the House, and was reported out of the
Senate Judiciary Committee, but never came to a floor vote.
Id.
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debt in the system, and we have credit systems that are more stratified by class
and race than ever before.
For individual bankruptcy debtors as a whole, it now makes little sense to
forbid strip down. Many mortgages are under water now and the home is the
most valuable asset for most families. Homeownership is a proxy for wealth, as
well as equity and opportunity,118 and homeownership is consistently associated
lower neighborhood crime rates, more stable neighborhoods, better outcomes
for children, and a better economy overall.119 Homes also play a role in upward
mobility, beyond just the wealth they represent. They represent purpose,
belonging, and a sense of community beyond one’s self and one’s family.120
Additionally, borrowers would not get off scot-free or be encouraged to
engage in moral hazard. To the contrary, they would face the shame of
bankruptcy, subject themselves to the huge disclosures required by bankruptcy,
and be subject to a court-supervised budget for three to five years.121
Allowing strip down has the potential to ameliorate one of the worst effects
of the financial crisis, the high level of wealth lost in communities of color.122
The 2008 financial crisis devastated communities of color. For example, middle
class black families now have less than fifty percent of the wealth they had

118
The racial homeownership gap contributes to the wealth gap because home ownership often represents
the lion’s share of a family’s wealth. Traub et al., Racial Wealth Gap, supra note 42, at 9. Home ownership also
influences broader disparities in net worth. Maroto, supra note 53, at 820. White families are more likely to
receive inheritance and assistance from family to put down a deposit on a home and can thus own a home earlier,
and discriminatory practices in lending such as redlining or giving people of color higher interest rate mortgages
also contribute to the homeownership gap. Traub et al., Racial Wealth Gap, supra note 42, at 9 (defining the
wealth gap as “the absolute difference in wealth holdings between the median household among populations
grouped by race or ethnicity.”). Id. at 10; see also Jeffrey P. Thompson & Gustavo Suarez, Updating the Racial
Wealth Gap (Fin. and Econ. Discussion Series, Working Paper No. 2015-76, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3072923 (describing the role of inheritance and family wealth across racial lines and
the role of this family money in perpetuating the wealth gap). These researchers claim that wealth differences
between black and white families derive 100% from different asset holdings, while wealth differences between
black and Hispanic families result mostly from different debt holdings. Id. at 1.
119
Id. The racial homeownership gap also contributes to the wealth gap because home ownership often
represents the lion’s share of a family’s wealth. Id. at 9. Home ownership also influences broader disparities in
net worth. Maroto, supra note 53, at 820. White families are more likely to receive inheritance and assistance
from family to put down a deposit on a home and can thus own a home earlier, and discriminatory practices in
lending such as redlining or giving people of color higher interest rate mortgages also contribute to the
homeownership gap. Traub et al., Racial Wealth Gap, supra note 42, at 9.
120
Joseph M. Harkness & Sandra J. Newman, Effects of Homeownership on Children: The Role of
Neighborhood Characteristics and Family Income, ECON. POL’Y REV., FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y. 78, 89 (2003).
121
Levitin, Resolving the Foreclosure Crisis, supra note 89, at 577.
122
Atkinson, Modifying Mortgage Discrimination, supra note 80, at 1044.
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accumulated prior to the crisis123 and sixty-six percent for Latino families.124 By
comparison, white families’ wealth declined by just 14.5% over the same
period.125 This occurred because black and Latino households held more of their
wealth in their homes, and also because of massive discrimination in home
lending, that led more persons of color to be steered into subprime mortgages
even if they qualified for cheaper ones.126 According to Abbye Atkinson, this
means middle-class-ascendant minorities paid more for their homes, diverting
money from retirement savings, college savings, and other wealth-building
products.127 When the financial crisis dust settled, middle-class black Americans
and Latinos had lost their homes to foreclosure twice as often as white people.128
Assuming lenders are at all sensitive to being stripped down, mortgage
modification has the potential to reverse these discriminatory practices through
the threat of strip down. Black Americans are more likely to have underwater
mortgages or live in communities with more underwater homes.129 Allowing
strip down for this reason is particularly critical and necessary given the
persistence of discrimination in many credit markets despite laws against these
practices.130
Finally, the right of debtors to modify their underwater home loans in
bankruptcy might finally incentivize lenders to curtail and police discriminatory
lending practices that decades of anti-discrimination legislation and policy have
failed to stamp out.131 Modifying the outdated anti-strip down provision could
help police lender behavior, while enabling economically disenfranchised and
financially distressed homeowners, many of whom are subject to discriminatory
lending practices, to hang on to their homes through financial crises. This one
123

Id. at 1043–44.
Id.
125
Id. at 1043.
126
Id. at 1044.
127
Id.
128
Id.
129
Id. at 1046–47.
130
Id. at 1049 (citing Lea Deutsch, Note, Collateral Damage: Mitigating The Effects Of Foreclosure In
Communities, 22 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 203, 207–09 (2012)) (describing community problems that
follow in the wake of mass foreclosures including blight, increased crime, depressed property values, and
depressed tax base); Michael A. Fletcher, A Shattered Foundation: African Americans Who Bought Homes in
Prince George’s Have Watched Their Wealth Vanish, WASH. POST (Jan. 24, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.
com/sf/investigative/2015/01/24/the-americandream-shatters-in-prince-georges-county/ (citing the 2013
Federal Reserve’s Survey of Consumer Finances) (describing a federal survey, which showed that in 2013, one
in seven black Americans had underwater mortgages as compared to one in eighteen white homeowners).
131
As Atkinson notes, “[r]ecent agreements between mortgage lenders and the DOJ and CFPB to settle
charges of unlawful discriminatory lending practices support this reality.” Atkinson, Modifying Mortgage
Discrimination, supra note 80, at 1046–47.
124
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change could help ameliorate the “perverse incentives of lenders who continue
to target these vulnerable borrowers and vulnerable communities for predatory
and unlawful loan products.”132
Additionally, looking at benefits to society of another kind, the foreclosure
crisis wiped out equity in entire neighborhoods and communities. Giving
members of these communities another option for saving their homes could
stabilize neighborhoods and communities in the event of another crash.133 This
would also save taxpayers a bundle on bureaucratic programs that while
designed to fix the program, do not work.134
Presumably this strip down would occur by writing the principal of the loan
down to the value of the home and then resetting the interest rate to the Till rate
and then, presuming a debtor could finish his or her chapter 13 plan, allowing
the debtor to pay the reduced amount at the reduced rate for the rest of the loan
term.135 This is admittedly different than the way other debts get stripped down
in chapter 13. Stripped down debt in chapter 13 are typically paid over the life
of the three to five-year plan whereas, here, the loan would carry a reduced
principal and interest rate for its entire original term which will likely last far
longer than the plan. In this way, this solution would mirror treatment of secured
claims in chapter 11, which are often crammed down and stretched out over the
life of the collateral, in the case of real estate for ten, twenty years or more.
2. Allow all Vehicles to Be Stripped Down
Like high-cost mortgages, black Americans and Latinos take out more highcost auto loans.136 In addition to taking out loans with very high interest rates,
the loans are packed with fees like yield-spread premiums,137 added “service
contracts,” and other mark-ups.138 These types of abuses have been particularly
concentrated in Native American communities,139 where one group of car
132

Id. at 1083.
See Hauser, supra note 113, at 226.
134
Id. at 227.
135
Id. at 235.
136
Id.; see also Johnson, supra note 78, at 182–84.
137
Hauser, supra note 113, at 208.
138
Id. at 183–84.
139
Megan Horning, Border Town Bullies: The Bad Auto Deal and Subprime Lending Problem among
Navajo Nation Car Buyers, 73 NAT’L LAWS. GUILD J. 197–98 (2016), https://www.nlg.org/nlg-review/
article/border-town-bullies-the-bad-auto-deal-and-subprime-lending-problem-among-navajo-nation-carbuyers/; see also Editor’s Preface, stating that:
133

“Border Town Bullies: The Bad Auto Deal and Subprime Lending Problem among Navajo
Nation Car Buyers” by Megan Horning examines a particularly reprehensible example of the kind
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dealers is now being investigated by the Federal Trade Commission, which seeks
injunctive relief, rescission or reformation of contracts, restitution, the refund of
monies paid, disgorgement of ill-gotten funds, and other equitable relief for acts
or practices in violation of Section 5(a) of the FTC Act, TILA and its
implementing Regulation Z, and CLA and its implementing Regulation M.140
Under the 2005 Amendments, the hanging paragraph forbids the strip down
of auto loans taken out during the 910 days before the filing. No good reason for
this change has been articulated and it appears to be a carrot to the auto finance
industry with no further rationale.141
For nearly all Americans, cars are important assets.142 They are typically the
most expensive things consumers buy other than homes and Americans rely on
them to get to work and support themselves.143 Not surprisingly then, one reason
Americans seek bankruptcy protection is to help save their cars.144 Data from
the Consumer Bankruptcy Project show that over eighty-five percent of chapter
7 debtors want to use bankruptcy to keep their most valuable car and over
seventy-five percent want to use bankruptcy to save a second car.145 Debtors are
literally driven to bankruptcy by a motivation to save cars, particularly the large
subset of debtors who own cars but little else and those who own negative equity
in their cars.146 In some ways bankruptcy plays a larger role in saving cars than
in saving homes, making the hanging paragraph’s prohibition against stripping
down auto loans more pernicious than the prohibition from stripping down home
loans.147

of predatory lending. It explores the crushing effects predatory car loans continue to have on
Navajo people. Horning explains the numerous social, cultural, economic, and geographical
factors that combine to make the Navajo community uniquely susceptible to the profitmaximizing machinations of car dealerships. It comprehensively maps out the fraud, trickery, and
coercion used against borrowers for whom a car is a necessity due to the remote and sparsely
populated region in which they live. After diagnosing the problem, Horning goes on to suggest a
list of remedies that might help protect the Navajo from continued exploitation.
Editor’s Preface to Winter 2016 Edition, available at https://www.nlg.org/nlg-review/article/editors-prefacewinter-2016/.
140
FTC v. Tate’s Auto Ctr. of Winslow Incorporation, No. CV-18-08176-PCT-DJH, 2019 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 39477 (D. Ariz. Mar. 12, 2019).
141
David Gray Carlson, Cars in Chapter 13: Does Negative Equity Destroy the Jurisdiction of the
Hanging Paragraph? 20 AM. BANK. L. REV. 535, 536 (2012).
142
Pamela Foohey et al., Driven to Bankruptcy, 55 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 2–5 (2020) (forthcoming).
143
Id. at 2.
144
Id. at 21.
145
Id. at 35.
146
Id.
147
Id. at 37–39.
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Once again, black American debtors are more likely than white debtors to
be driven to file bankruptcy to save cars.148 They are also more likely to have
high-interest auto loans, and stripping down those interest rates in chapter 13
could be disproportionately more valuable for these often predatory loans.149
While bankruptcy cannot close racial disparities in car prices, auto loan interest
rates, and repossession rates, it can help close these gaps by making strip down
more available for all filers.150 Thus, repealing the hanging paragraph could go
a long way toward making consumer bankruptcy more relevant and more
racially neutral as well.
B. Allow the Discharge of All Student Loans and Particularly Private Student
Loans
A big step toward making consumer bankruptcy more relevant to the needs
of the people is to reconsider the treatment of student loans in the bankruptcy
system.151 While this is particularly important for leveling the economic playing
field for people of color, who on average, pay higher interest rates on student
loans and receive lower quality educations, the issue is important to all
Americans given the size of the current student loan debt. High educational debts
with low value can literally cause poverty, rather than alleviating poverty as
much student loan debt might.152

148

Id.
Id.
150
Id. at 39.
151
Daniel A. Austin, The Indentured Generation: Bankruptcy and Student Loan Debt, 53 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 329, 336 (2013); Abbye Atkinson, Race, Educational Loans, and Bankruptcy, 16 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1,
31–40 [hereinafter Atkinson, Race, Educational Loans, and Bankruptcy] (explaining that removing student loans
from the list of nondischargeable debts, going back to the time-lapse strategy of discharging student loan debt,
having Congress define “undue hardship” or making college more affordable).
152
This issue is of local as well as national interest to me. According to the New Mexico Center on Law
and Poverty:
149

New Mexico has the second highest rate of default on student loan debt in the country. Recent
research has shown that student loan servicing companies have systemically steered borrowers
away from the affordable repayment plans they have the right to under federal law, often leaving
borrowers in even greater debt and contributing to high rates of defaults.
One potential solution for New Mexico borrowers that came up at the Fall convening and in
conversations since is developing outreach and know your rights trainings for student borrowers
around our state. Because there aren’t a whole lot a resources to help student loan borrowers
troubleshoot and navigate their repayment options, we wanted to pull everyone together to discuss
the ways that we can collaborate to provide trainings for borrowers around New Mexico.
Email from Lindsay Cutler, staff attorney for New Mexico Center for Law and Poverty (Dec. 17, 2019). Id.

Published by Emory Law Scholarly Commons, 2020

25

MARTIN_7.15.20

606

7/15/2020 3:00 PM

Emory Bankruptcy Developments Journal, Vol. 36, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 9
EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 36

1. The Debt is Huge and the Percentage of Income Going to Student Loans
is Even Larger for Persons of Color
Minorities pay more for student loans and have more student loan debt.153
These higher debt rates resulted in part from differences in wealth, family
background, postsecondary educational differences, and family contributions to
college among black and white students, but this does not explain the entire
disparity. Young adults’ net worth explains a portion of the black-white disparity
in debt, suggesting that both differences in accumulation of debt and ability to
repay debt in young adulthood explain racial disparities in debt, but also that the
black-white disparity was greatest at the highest levels of parents’ net worth.
Somehow, the black students were not insulated by their parents’ wealth, even
when that wealth was equal to the wealth of the white students.154 Thus, a larger
than proportionate share of the increasing costs of a higher education is being
carried by black students.155 This reinforces existing social stratification and
allows racial economic disparities to be inherited across generations.156
A survey of consumer finances similarly found that racial inequalities were
more prevalent for student loans than any other debt and that this growth in debt
was not attributable to differences in educational attainment across racial
groups.157 Rather, it resulted from “predatory inclusion” in which lenders
offered exploitive loans that limited or eliminate the long-term benefits of
getting the education in the first place.158
153
Atkinson, supra note 151, at 24–31. Atkinson discusses how student loan debt can be particularly
harmful to black Americans because black Americans are more likely to borrow money for school, have less
family resources, and are given worse credit terms. Id.; see also Fenaba R. Addo, Jason N. Houle & Daniel
Simon, Young, Black, and (Still) in the Red: Parental Wealth, Race, and Student Loan Debt, 8 RACE AND SOCIAL
PROBLEMS 64 (2016). Atkinson also explains that since student loan debt has a disproportionately harmful impact
on black Americans, educational achievement alone is not enough to justify the special protection student loans
are given in the bankruptcy system. Atkinson, supra note 151, at 26–28.
154
Id.
155
Richard Fry et al., Young Adults, Student Debt, and Economic Well-being, PEW RESEARCH CTR. 19–
20 (2014), https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2014/05/ST_2014.05.14_student-debt_
complete-report.pdf.
156
Id.
157
Louise Seamster & Raphaël Charron-Chénier, Predatory Inclusion and Education Debt: Rethinking
the Racial Wealth Gap, 4 SOC. CURRENTS 199, 6–7 (2017).
158
Id. at 2. Similarly, Scott-Clayton and Li found that after earning their bachelor’s degrees, black college
graduates owe $7,400 more on average than their white peers. Judith Scott-Clayton & Jing Li, Black-White
Disparity in Student Loan Debt More Than Triples After Graduation (2016), https://vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/
bitstream/handle/10919/83265/BlackWhiteDisparity.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. Black students owe an
average of $23,400 compared to $16,000 for white students. After a few years, the black-white debt gap more
than triples to over $25,000. Differences in interest accrual and graduate school borrowing lead to black
graduates holding nearly $53,000 in student loan debt four years after graduation, which is nearly twice as much
as their white counterparts. These data show far greater debt gaps than previous research.

https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/ebdj/vol36/iss2/9

26

MARTIN_7.15.20

2020]

7/15/2020 3:00 PM

Martin: Bringing Relevance Back to Consumer Bankruptcy
BRINGING RELEVANCE BACK

607

While there is debate about whether the massive student loan debt in
America could create another financial crisis,159 no one denies that this debt is
as large as it has ever been.160 It is the second largest amount of consumer debt
in the U.S. economy after mortgages.161 Student loan debt has grown more than
any other category of consumer spending, at three times the rate of inflation.162
In 2011, 37 million Americans owed a total of one trillion163 and by 2019, this
amount had risen to $1.6 trillion.164 Calling this generation the indentured
generation, one scholar notes that tuition ballooned from twenty-three percent
of annual earnings in 2001 to thirty-eight percent of annual earnings in 2010.165
As of 2019, this percentage is no doubt even higher. 166

159
See Jonathan D. Glater, Student Debt and the Siren Song of Systemic Risk, 53 HARV. J. ON LEG. 99
(2016) (arguing against a bubble); but see also NAT’L ASS’N OF CONSUMER BANKR. ATT’YS, STUDENT LOAN
DEBT CRISES SURVEY (2012), http://nacba.org/Portals /0/Documents/Student%20Loan%20Debt/020712%
20NACBA%20ststude%20loa n%20survey.pdf (finding that eighty-one percent of consumer bankruptcy
attorneys say that clients with student loan debt have increased noticeably within the past four years, and that
the effective lack of bankruptcy discharge for these debts prevents debtors from obtaining a financial fresh start);
Daniel Wagner, CFPB: Private Student Loans Parallel Subprime Mortgage Lending, HUFF. POST (July 20,
2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/20/cfpb-private-student-loans-subprimemortgage_n_1688771.
html (stating that private student loan lenders gave loans without regard to whether students could pay, then
bundled and resold the loans, though federal government loans are not underwritten).
160
Austin, supra note 151, at 336.
161
Clifford, Robert, Student-Loan Debt, Delinquency, and Default: A New England Perspective (Sept. 1,
2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3031192. In 2009, student-loan debt became the largest non-housing-related
consumer debt in the United States. By 2013, outstanding student debt balances had grown to exceed $1 trillion,
and by the end of 2015, had reached $1.23 trillion.
162
Austin, supra note 151, at 336. Austin’s article about the student loan crisis deals with a national debt
crisis that has been covered extensively by news outlets. It builds upon the work of Professor Rafael Pardo and
notes that student loan debt has now outgrown all other forms of consumer debt and that an education is the most
expensive thing most of us will purchase other than a house. He includes provides a detailed description of how
the Bankruptcy Code treats student loan debt, concluding that such debt is generally non-dischargeable despite
that most other non-dischargeable debt involves either debt resulting from a nefarious act like fraud or driving
drunk, or is deeply needed for survival by the recipient, such as child support. He makes a strong case that
making student loan debt non-dischargeable is an outlier, in the sense that it neither results from a terrible act,
nor is that critical to the recipient. Id.
163
Austin, supra note 151, at 330.
164
Ellen Paris, Student Loan Debt Still Impacting Millennial Homebuyers, FORBES (Mar. 31, 2019),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenparis/2019/03/31/student-loan-debt-still-impacting-millennial-homebuyers/
#4233ecac3e78.
165
Austin, supra note 151, at 357.
166
See Alison Doyle, Average Salary Information for US Workers, THE BALANCE CAREERS (May 10,
2019), https://www.thebalancecareers.com/average-salary-information-for-us-workers-2060808 (last visited
Feb. 6, 2020); The median wage in the United States in the first quarter of 2019 was $47,060. Id. Jaleesa
Bustamante, Average Cost of College & Tuition, EDUCATIONDATA.ORG (June 7, 2019), https://educationdata.
org/average-cost-of-college/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2020). For the 2018–2019 academic year, the average cost of a
public college is $10,230 and the average cost of a private college is $35,839, seemingly showing that the cost
of public college was approximately twenty-two percent of annual earnings and the cost of private college was
approximately seventy-six percent of annual earnings. Id.

Published by Emory Law Scholarly Commons, 2020

27

MARTIN_7.15.20

608

7/15/2020 3:00 PM

Emory Bankruptcy Developments Journal, Vol. 36, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 9
EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 36

While these increases have resulted in more students gaining access to higher
education, which would seem to benefit persons of color in particular, wages for
that group have been even flatter than for other Americans, making tuition an
even larger percentage of annual earnings for those groups.167 Moreover, a large
part of the increased access has been access to low-value educations,
characterized by higher tuition, lower graduation rates, and even lower job
placements rates.168 Low graduation rates create the ultimate no-value student
loans––those students must pay despite little access to a better life.169
While for-profit universities and colleges are to blame for some of the
increases in tuition costs and student loan debt, for-profit universities are by no
means alone in increasing tuition costs.170 These increases in tuition costs may
be fueled by the increase in availability of student loans,171 a theory known as
the Bennett Principle after President Reagan’s Secretary of Education, William
J. Bennett.172 Bennett wrote a scathing New York Times op-ed accusing colleges
of greedily raising tuition, confident that Federal Loan subsidies would expand
to make up the difference.173 The availability of student loan credit has spurred
building booms at colleges across the nation, for which current and future
students pay.174 Additionally, high student loan debt and persistently low wages
likely discourage students from taking jobs as teachers or in other public service
jobs.175
Making more student loans available was originally thought to have the
capacity to create parity among different socio-economic groups. In reality, this
increase in credit availability and the concurrent increase in tuition has had the
exact opposite effect.176 The growth in federal student loan programs and bloated
college costs has led to a growth in socio-economic disparity between races,
classes, and ethnic groups.177

167
Usual Weekly Earnings of Wage and Salary Workers Fourth Quarter 2019, BUREAU
STATISTICS U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR (2020), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/wkyeng.pdf.
168
Austin, supra note 151, at 336.
169
Id. at 335–36.
170
Id. at 405–06.
171
Glater, supra note 159, at 112; Austin, supra note 151, at 346.
172
Glater, supra note 159, at 112.
173
Id.
174
Austin, supra note 151, at 345–46.
175
Id. at 402–403.
176
Id. at 346.
177
Id. at 346 n.128.
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2. Special Problems for Students For-Profit Universities
The largest and fastest growth in student loans is for students at for-profit
schools, even though students at these schools have a lower graduation rate,
higher debt, and higher tendency to default on loans.178 Similar to payday and
title loans and subprime mortgages, some of this debt is low-value debt, meaning
that the education results in little increase in future income.179 There is no doubt
that the Bennett Principle has resulted in far more for-profit colleges and thus
far more no-value and low-value educations. The schools are expensive for the
value they provide and virtually all of the students at these schools take out
student loans compared to a fraction at other colleges and universities.180 They
are also attended by higher percentages of students of color.
3. How to Pay When the Time Comes
For all student loans, when it comes time to pay them, student have choices.
Unfortunately, none are very good choices. One choice is to pay as originally
indicated. Another is to enter into one of many income-based repayment plans,
which can result in zero payment for at least a while. Another choice is to take
a public service job, pay as indicated or under an income-based plan for five or
ten years and then get the debt forgiven. Yet another, a choice of last resort for
most, is to file for bankruptcy and try to discharge the debts. Considering the
non-bankruptcy options first, paying as indicated can be hard to say the least.
Daniel Austin provides some examples of astronomically high average debt.181
Income-based repayment plans can be handy at the time and can get a borrower
through hard times, but they lead to future hard times as the debt continues to
earn interest and mushroom.182

178
Id. at 335 (citing STANDARD & POOR’S, US Student Loan ABS Issuances Ticking Up, But the Future Is
Uncertain Say Conference Speakers 2 (2012), http://www.standardandpoors.com/spf/upload/Events_US/
US_SF_Event_619abs 10.pdf); Chris Kirkham, For-Profit College Students Face Higher Debt, More
Unemployment, Report Finds, HUFF. POST (Jan. 4, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/03/forprofit-colleges-unemploymentdebt_n_1182164.html.
179
There are many ways some of this debt has become no value or low value debt because educational
opportunities have been extent expanded greatly, including expanding no-value and low-value education. Novalue and low-value education is provided primarily by for-profit universities that charge high tuition for degrees
that result in low pay and low job placement.
180
Austin, supra note 151, at 405–06.
181
Before entering academia, I paid my own debts off from September of 1986 to 1996, ten years to the
month from my first payment. I worked at a large private law firm and also had the support of a debt-free spouse.
My debts were also a fraction of the debts of those graduating today.
182
34 C.F.R. §§ 685.204(a)(1), (h), 682.210(a)(1), (8) (2014).
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A few student loan forgiveness programs seem to work well,183 but most are
turning into unfulfilled promises. In 2008, the Obama Administration started a
program through which professionals could work at public interest jobs for ten
years and then be forgiven for the rest of their student debt. As of September
2018, 28,000 borrowers submitted their applications to have their student loan
debts forgiven.184 However, only ninety-six applications were approved, less
than a half of one percent.185 Borrowers have been unable to communicate with
FedLoan Servicing because FedLoan Servicing itself is confused about the exact
requirements of the Public Service Loan Forgiveness program.186
In 2016, four attorneys and the American Bar Association (ABA) sued the
Department of Education because they believed the Department of Education
changed the terms of the Public Service Loan Forgiveness program.187
According to the ABA, the ABA itself was considered a public service job prior
to the new regulations, but the Department of Education changed its
interpretation in 2016.188 The program seems to have been changed not just for
new applicants but for those who had already applied and been accepted.189 In
February 2019, U.S. District Judge Timothy Kelly ruled that the Department of
Education acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it changed its interpretation
of the Public Service Loan Forgiveness regulation.190 In other words, the
Department of Education is not voluntarily complying with loan forgiveness
programs.
4. History and Rationale Behind the Nondischargeability of Student Loans
Moving on to the bankruptcy options, these options are not relevant for many
consumers. These options have also been chipped away over the years with little
evidence of any need to do so. Prior to the enactment of the modern Bankruptcy
Code in 1978, student loans were dischargeable in bankruptcy and thus treated

183

See Austin, supra note 151, 347–51.
Stacey Cowley, 28,000 Public Servants Sought Student Loan Forgiveness. 96 Got It, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/27/business/student-loan-forgiveness.html.
185
Id.
186
Id.
187
ABA v. United States Dep’t of Educ., 370 F. Supp. 3d 1, 10 (D.D.C. 2019).
188
Debra Cassens Weiss, In About-face, Several ABA Employees Are Told They Qualify for Public Service
Loan Forgiveness, ABA JOURNAL (Aug. 27, 2019), https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/in-about-faceseveral-aba-employees-are-told-they-qualify-for-public-service-loan-forgiveness (last visited on Dec. 2,
2019).
189
Id. For example, some of the attorneys who had already been told they would qualify began receiving
notices that year that they no longer qualified for the program.
190
ABA, 370 F. Supp. 3d at 10.
184
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no differently than other unsecured debt.191 When the 1978 Code was enacted,
student loans were only dischargeable in bankruptcy under two conditions.192
First, if the loans originated before five years before the bankruptcy filing, they
were discharged. Second, the loan could be discharged after a court hearing if
the debtor could prove that the “student loan would impose an undue hardship
on the debtor and the debtor’s dependents . . . .”193 Courts and commentators
have struggled for years over the meaning of this amorphous phrase and while
results vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, all agree that getting an undue
hardship discharge is difficult enough that few bankruptcy debtors bother
trying.194 This is true despite an obvious inability to pay these debts in many
cases.195
The original rationale for making student loans not dischargeable in 1978
was that lenders were lending to borrowers without underwriting, meaning
without determining the borrowers’ ability to pay, so they were taking on
additional risk.196 Moreover, as a society, we needed to ensure a steady stream
of future funds for future student borrowers.197 Third, there was a fear that
students would knowingly take on the debt and then plan to discharge it later in
bankruptcy, a form of moral hazard. Finally, because students voluntarily took
on the debt, there was a feeling that they should pay it no matter what, rather
than shifting the loss to the creditor.198 We will look at these rationales again,
but these last two clearly apply to any debt.
From this original treatment of student loans in the 1978 Code, Congress has
tightened the standard bit by bit, all while extending the nondischargeability of
student loans to more and more lenders.199 With no evidence suggesting abuse
191

11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (1978).
Ryan Freeman, Comment, Student-Loan Discharge—An Empirical Study of the Undue Hardship
Provision of § 523(A)(8) Under Appellate Review 30 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 147, 150 (2013); 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(8).
193
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8); see also Austin, supra note 151, at 376 (citing Rafael Pardo & Michelle Lacey,
The Real Student-Loan Scandal: Undue Hardship Discharge Litigation 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 180, 185–90
(2009)).
194
Austin, supra note 151, at 338–400. There are numerous studies showing that it is hard to discharge
student loan debt under the undue hardship test. See id. (citing Pardo & Lacey, supra note 193, at 205). One
study shows the likely of discharge by federal appellate court, and also shows that the presence of a medical
condition can improve chances. Freeman, supra note 192, at 181. It also shows that a debtor has a better chance
of success if he or she is pro se. Id.
195
Austin, supra note 151, at 400 (citing Pardo & Lacey, supra note 193 at 479–86).
196
Austin, supra note 151, at 368.
197
Id. at 369; Atkinson, supra note 151, at 22.
198
Austin, supra note 151, at 369–370.
199
Freeman, supra note 192, at 150 n.11, 155; 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8); Pardo & Lacey, supra note 193, at
180–81.
192
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on the part of debtors wishing to discharge student loans, in 1990, Congress
extended the five-year period for discharging a student loan without undue
hardship, to seven years.200 Again with no evidence of abuse, Congress in 1998
eliminated the seven-year option entirely, leaving only “undue hardship” as
grounds to discharge a student loan.201 Finally, in 2005, in connection with The
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA),202
Congress handed private student loan lenders, which generally charge higher
interest than the federal government even though they do underwrite loans, a
huge carrot. Unlike all other private lenders, these lenders now get the same
protections as Federal Loan providers, namely nondischargeabilty.203
5. Unjustified Special Treatment for Private Student Loans
The justification for not discharging private student loans was that this would
reduce the cost of these private loans and make these loans more affordable and
available to more people, including people who would otherwise have difficulty
getting credit such as students from communities of color.204 As it turns out, the
theory that making private student loans nondischargeable would reduce their
costs turned out to be untrue. The loans have not decreased in cost,205 nor are
borrowers particularly sensitive to incremental price differentials at the time they
take out these loans.206 Moreover, the loans themselves are not subject to interest
rate caps, and are thus much more expensive than federal student loans.207 Some
carry interest rates of fifteen percent or more and some even carry adjustable
interest rates. They often offer no deferments, income-contingent repayment
plans, or any of the other relief provided for federal loans.208 Like subprime
mortgage loans,209 more than half of the students who take out these loans do so
before maxing out on cheaper federal loans.210
200

11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8).
Freeman, supra note 192, at 155. Perhaps this is obvious, but the debtor has to prove undue hardship.
Pardo & Lacey, supra note 193, at 185–90. This proof is hard to accomplish and the substance and the procedure
undermines the fresh start. The resulting burden on courts has also been significant. Moreover, many debtors do
not bother trying.
202
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, §418, 199
Stat. 23 (2005).
203
Alexei Alexandrov & Dalié Jiménez, Lessons from Bankruptcy Reform in the Private Student Loan
Market, 11 HARV. L. & P’LY REV. 177, 180–81.
204
Id. at 178.
205
Id. at 202–06.
206
Id. at 206–08.
207
Austin, supra note 151, at 343.
208
Id.
209
Bar-Gill & Warren, Making Credit Safer, supra note 55, at 32.
210
Austin, supra note 151, at 344.
201
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Despite all of these unfavorable (for students) terms, we are now we are left
with remarkable protection for private student loans. These lenders enjoy
protection no other private lenders enjoy, including mortgage lenders, whose
deficiencies still get discharged. All other unsecured creditors get their loans
discharged regardless of how the loans are incurred. This is the primary function
of consumer bankruptcy and the mechanism for providing the fresh start. 211
6. Rationale for Reversal of Student Loan Nondischargeability
The outlier treatment for private student loan lenders described above was a
net loss for students and an unjustifiable net gain for one sector of the private
lending community. Since people of color take out more expensive private loans
than others, the loss gain falls on them, further perpetuating the debt gap between
them and other Americans, which in turn furthers the income and wealth gap.212
As explained by Jimenez and Alexandrov:
[p]oor and minority students are disproportionately affected by our
system of student loans. Minority students are more likely to enroll in
for-profit schools, borrow more than their white counterparts for the
same degrees, more likely to fail to graduate, and more likely to default
on student loans in general . . . while white college graduates seem to
enjoy an “economic cushion” from their college education, African
American college graduates do not. Unlike their white counterparts,
‘African American college graduates are equally likely to file for
bankruptcy as African Americans without a college diploma.’ Most
recently, researchers at the Brookings Institution found that [f]our
years after graduation, black graduates have nearly $25,000 more
student loan debt than white graduates: $52,726 on average, compared
to $28,006 for the typical white graduate.213

As Professor Abbye Atkinson explains in Race, Educational Loans, and
Bankruptcy, black students may be more significantly affected by student loan
nondischargeability than white students due to the costliness of their loans, lower
wages post-education, fewer family resources to support educational cost, and a
likelihood of more legal and other dependents to support.214 Professor
Atkinson’s work is unique in that it comes from the 2007 Consumer Bankruptcy
Project dataset.215 These data also show that higher education acts as a buffer to
financial distress in white students but not necessarily for black students, perhaps
211
212
213
214
215

Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 287 (1991).
Seamster & Charron-Chénier, supra note 157, at 6–7.
Alexandrov & Jiminez, supra note 203, at 181–82 (internal quotations omitted).
Atkinson, supra note 151, at 26–29.
Alexandrov & Jiminez, supra note 203, at 181–82.
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because of the relatively high cost of this credit, among the other factors noted
above.216 Whatever the reason, forbidding the discharge of student loans
disproportionately harms persons of color.
If all of this were not enough, private student loan lenders also now use
fintech companies (online financial technology firms), to screen borrowers for
various types of consumer loans and connect them with third-party lenders.217
These new technologies exacerbate racial inequalities in credit. Rather than
relying entirely on FICO scores to assess creditworthiness, fintech companies
use artificial intelligence algorithms that study “where borrowers live, what
clubs they belong to, their text messaging habits, their health records, and even
their social media activity.”218 Fintech companies also use more traditional data
like transcripts, standardized test scores, college majors, the prestige of their
degree, parents’ level of educational attainment, whether a student worked
during high school, and the number of colleges a student visited with a parent.219
While this sounds promising given that it is harmful to lend to people who
cannot repay,220 the on-the-ground applications of these data points are more
pernicious. While the companies claim their goal is to “include those who have
been left out of the financial space in innovative, profitable ways,”221 many of
these innovative data points reinforce “preexisting income, class, racial, and
ethnic barriers in the credit economy, as well as produce effective discrimination
toward legally protected classes.”222
However, reform is justified for all student loans, not just private ones. High
student loan balances limit people’s access to the credit economy.223 For those
who do get credit, those with defaults on student loans will pay more for the
credit they do get.224 Excessive debt also causes adverse health outcomes,225

216

Atkinson, supra note 151, at 2–3.
This is highly simplified. For a more sophisticated description, see Christopher K. Odinet, The New
Data of Student Debt, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 1617, 1635–40 (2019).
218
Id. at 1645. According to one credit it industry executive, “how many times a person says ‘wasted’ in
their [social media] profile . . . has some value in predicting whether they’re going to repay their debt . . . .” Id.
at 1645.
219
Id. at 1645 n.214.
220
Alexandrov & Jiminez, supra note 203, at 212–13 (recommending underwriting for private student
loans).
221
Odinet, supra note 217, at 1651.
222
Odinet, supra note 217, at 1621; Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due
Process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 13 (2014).
223
Austin, supra note 151, at 331.
224
Id. at 406.
225
Id. at 333, 400–02.
217
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which cost the public more in increased insurance costs and health care for the
indigent. These problems affect entire families226 and society as a whole.227
Additionally, the CFPB was at one time very active in policing bad student loan
providers. Since the CFPB no longer monitors these providers, discharge of
student loans is even more justified.
7. Some Law Student Thoughts on Student Loan Dischargeability
Admittedly, the quotes below do not come from rigorous empirical research
nor are they random. They were generated from my Fall 2019 bankruptcy exam,
on which I offered extra credit to those who wished to weigh in on the pros and
cons on discharging student loans in bankruptcy. I did not cover this topic in
detail in class nor did I express any particular opinion on the subject. Most
students understood that allowing student loan debt to be discharged would
allow students to shirk responsibility and perhaps make a bankruptcy discharge
too common and easy for the common good. Most, though, felt that times were
sufficiently different today than a decade ago, expressing these types of
sentiments:
Discharging student loan debt in bankruptcy would allow graduates
who are either under-employed or unemployed to free themselves of
financial obligations that are otherwise not allowing them to live
freely. In other words, allowing them to spend money on things like
real property or consumer goods that they cannot otherwise buy. From
a broader policy view, disallowing discharge of student loan debt may
have a chilling effect on individuals who would otherwise seek a postsecondary education, but cannot afford the price tag.
Letting individuals discharge student loan debt in bankruptcy may
increase the number of applicants and graduates, and then increase the
overall skilled workforce. More skilled workers means more people
with money to spend, which means a healthier economy.
Crippling student debt is holding a whole generation down from
having financial flexibility and spending. In the long run, it hurts the
economy and society because there is no way it will be paid back in
full. We are missing out on a lot because people have to get paid well
right away with hopes of paying back the loans.
College has become stinking expensive and the job market is not all it
used to be. These debts are causing significant burdens for some

226
227

Id. at 337–38.
Id. at 399.
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people. On a societal level, this huge debt is a serious weight on our
national economy.
So many colleges have moved to an essentially profit model. Most
state schools, while carrying the name of the state, receive little or no
funding. Thus, tuition and fees have been steadily increasing and the
burden on students grows. While the preclusion on discharge made
sense historically, with the current state of college tuition and
expenses, the debt should now be dischargeable.
The whole purpose of chapter 7 is to give debtors a fresh start. If the
debtor has thousands of dollars of nondischargeable student loan debt,
it takes away the main benefit of chapter 7. The debtor is still in debt,
and is still going to struggle to pay back the loans. Also, the undue
hardship test seems allows judges to make decisions based on values
and not the law. I understand the purpose of the test. If people can pay
back their loans they probably should, but the actual implementation
of the test seems to come down to the judge’s values and morals as we
saw in Educational Credit Management Corp. vs. Jespersen where the
Court made judgments about whether the debtor should keep living in
his brother’s basement and whether he should be allowed to buy
cigarettes. If student loans are not fully dischargeable, maybe they
could be partially dischargeable, or at the very least courts need a
better test to determine dischargeability.

A couple of students suggested middle grounds:
I believe that student debt to the extent of payment of the education,
including books and required schooling items like a laptop and
reasonable living expenses, should be discharged. I didn’t know
people who take out large loans so they are able to live lavishly. This
was mostly at colleges like USC, UCLA, or CU where image is
everything. Those expenses I would not discharge.
I believe that the debt should be stripped down to the equivalent of the
value of the degree and the future earning potential it represents.
Universities and colleges in the United States charge large amounts for
the same education that is offered at lower prices. Also, universities
need more money to educate students about the loans. Allowing a
discharge of student loans from universities where the degree is never
going to make a person enough money to support themselves causes
people to go through hardships and makes not just individuals suffer
but the overall economy as well. When I was looking for a law school
I was told that unless you were getting into the top five, go to the
cheapest one because you’re going to get the same education and you
shouldn’t pay more if you do not have to.
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And one student, who presumably knows nothing about the history of student
loan dischargeability, suggested that, like the old adage, what is old is new again:
I feel that there should be a middle ground where people have to show
that they made a real effort to not fall behind on their student loans
over a period of time, maybe five years, and then after that point, if it
is shown that they made an effort to eliminate the loans, the loans
should be discharged at that point.

8. How to Amend the Code to Address the Student Loan Issue
There are many ways the Bankruptcy Code could be amended to address
these issues. Austin suggests we reevaluate the fair market value of the student
loan, and do a student loan cram down or strip down of sorts.228 Alexandrov and
Jiménez suggest either a roll-back to the old dischargeability rules or a courtapplied underwriting standard.229 While these are both excellent suggestions,
they seem like a lot of work for courts with little reward. I would recommend
returning to the rule in which the student loans also are dischargeable after seven
years or upon a showing of undue hardship.
The way to address the for-profit contribution to this problem with the finest
point would be to limit the supply side of these educations, by limiting access to
federal student loans for for-profit universities that cannot prove value to
students though job placement and other indicators. This would be easy to
accomplish because these schools get the vast majority of their funding from
student loans. Almost no one goes to these institutions who can afford to pay.
While the process of doing this began under Obama and the CFPB, the current
administration likely has little appetite for this supply-side correction.230 An
overall standard that allowed discharge would work for these loans as well.

228
229

Id. at 414.
Alexandrov & Jiminez, supra note 203, at 221–22. They suggest:
borrowing from the Dodd-Frank Act and subsequent CFPB mortgage regulations, we suggest that
a lender should incur liability if it did not verify the student’s potential to repay the loan by
comparing the loan amount with the student’s choice of school and major’s expected graduation
rates and earnings post-graduation (if student even graduates) . . . [and creating] safe harbors for
the ease of administrability: high graduation rates at the school that student chose, high salaries
after graduating with a given major from this particular school, and an income-based repayment
plan . . . .

230
Erik Ortiz, Trump University Lawsuit Will Go to Trial, NY Judge Rules, NBC NEWS (Apr. 26, 2016),
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2016-election/trump-university-lawsuit-will-go-trial-ny-judge-rulesn562816 (last visited on Mar. 23, 2020). Because Trump had his own for-profit university, he is not as
enthusiastic about regulating them as other presidents might.
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III. DEFINING OURSELVES THROUGH OUR BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM
This section asks what we might do, now that we have so much income,
wealth, and debt inequality in our society, recognizing that the situation is
harmful for all of us but particularly for individuals and communities of color,
who pay more for credit and have worse outcomes in bankruptcy.231 Are we
motivated to use the bankruptcy system to attempt to solve some of these
problems, and if so how? If not, why not? Our answers reflect the kind of society
we wish to be or to become, now that so much in the world of consumer credit
has changed. The sections above provide some justification for the two major
changes suggested. Here we consider some broader societal issues and in light
of them, suggest a third amendment.
One principal common to all commercial law is that the systems are not
punitive. Rather, it is all about the money. We do not to take from one party
economically without benefitting another. For example, bankruptcy trustees and
executing creditors do not routinely take possession of a debtor’s assets unless
doing so will generate a return for creditors. To do so would harm the debtor
without helping anyone else.
With regard to home mortgages, Professor Levitin has shown that lenders
actually incur greater losses on a greater percentage of mortgages in foreclosure
than they would in a chapter 13 strip down and also that that mortgage markets
are indifferent to strip down risk because the number of mortgages that could be
modified at any given time is small in magnitude compared to the overall loans
in the system.232 Student loan markets similarly appear mostly insensitive to
bankruptcy discharge.233 If lenders are not underwriting for bankruptcy risks like
strip down and discharge, they are not financially weighing these concerns,
meaning they do not consider these risks to be significant. For the same reason
that a trustee cannot take a debtor’s used clothes, even though the trustee might
be entitled to them, these lenders should not be able to injure debtors without
significantly helping themselves. We should not protect banks from strip down
when they have chosen not to protect themselves from bad loans. The same is
true of private student loan lenders.
Bankruptcy is for the honest but unfortunate debtor.234 Some assistance to
the debtor is always contemplated and this benefits society too. This assistance

231
232
233
234

Rory Van Loo, A Tale of Two Bankruptcy Debtors, 72 ALB. L. REV. 231, 233 (2009).
Levitin, Resolving the Foreclosure Crisis, supra note 89, at 611.
Alexandrov & Jiminez, supra note 203, at 220–28.
Local Loan v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1923).
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is the basis of the fresh start. Conversely, a person trapped in perpetual
insolvency is a burden to both him or herself and society as well.235 Generally
speaking, forgiving debts is better for society than allowing a cycle of
impoverishment to continue. As the First Circuit explained in 2015: “Our
nation’s bankruptcy system was built on the principle that sometimes, honest
people fall on hard times. While the bankruptcy code has naturally gone through
revisions and updates since its inception, that foundational philosophy has
always laid at its root.”236
Our debtor-creditor laws, including exemption laws but others as well,
demonstrate a clear public policy that “exemption from personal pauperism is of
greater concern than the rights of creditors.”237 Indeed, the “very purpose” of the
Bankruptcy Code “is to protect debtors from pauperism.”238 In other words,
bankruptcy law is here to help, which it does for two broad categories of policy
reasons. First, these laws return debtors to productive economic participation, so
they can earn wages, support themselves, pay taxes, and fuel the economy by
buying things.239 Second, the system is here to soften financial blows and be
kind. While this second reason is sometimes described in terms of providing
social insurance,240 and at other times as humanitarian assistance worthy of a
civilized society,241 many courts and scholars embrace the idea that forgiving
debts builds character, is virtuous, and thus helps build a just society.242 In other
words, to forgive debts is humane and human.243
While sometimes stated as a third theory, utilitarianism supports both
economic and humanitarian reasons for bankruptcy relief, as both individuals

235
Nicholas J. Huffmon, Note, Putting the Hanging Paragraph Out to Pasture: Reconciling the Mandates
of Bankruptcy and Tax Law, 103 IOWA L. REV. 1729 (2018).
236
Fahey v. Mass. Dep’t of Revenue (In re Fahey), 779 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2015) (Thompson, J.,
dissenting).
237
Sligh v. First Nat’l Bank of Holmes Cty., 704 So. 2d 1020, 1025 (Miss. 1997) (quoting Leigh v.
Harrison, 11 So. 604, 606 (Miss. 1892)).
238
Id. at 1028.
239
Margaret Howard, A Theory of Discharge in Consumer Bankruptcy, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 1047, 1079
(1987) (articulating theory that reallocation of assets is needed to “assure the greatest probability that economic
function can be restored after bankruptcy”); Ronald J. Mann, Making Sense of Nation-Level Bankruptcy Filing
Rates, in CONSUMER CREDIT, DEBT AND BANKRUPTCY: COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 225,
242 (2009); John Pottow, Private Liability for Reckless Consumer Lending, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 405, 12 (2007).
240
Alan Schwartz, Regulating Consumer Bankruptcy: A Theoretical Inquiry, 291 LEGAL STUDIES 585,
592–93 (2000); SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 1.
241
KAREN GROSS, FAILURE AND FORGIVENESS 102–03 (1999).
242
Heidi Hurd, The Virtue of Consumer Bankruptcy, in A DEBTOR’S WORLD: INTERDISCIPLINARY
PERSPECTIVES ON DEBT 221–22 (2012).
243
Michael Sousa, The Principle of Consumer Utility: A Contemporary Theory of Bankruptcy Discharge,
58 U. KAN. L. REV. 553 (2010).

Published by Emory Law Scholarly Commons, 2020

39

MARTIN_7.15.20

620

7/15/2020 3:00 PM

Emory Bankruptcy Developments Journal, Vol. 36, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 9
EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 36

and societies benefit from providing broad bankruptcy relief.244 Stated in the
negative, financial problems cause endless forms of human agony and indignity,
including shame, embarrassment, guilt,245 poor health, depression, hopelessness,
loneliness, marital difficulties, mentally ill and scared children, difficulty
concentrating at work, and so on. As Professor Michael Sousa recounts:
Children of financially stressed parents tend to be more prone to
mental health problems, depression, loneliness, and are more
emotionally sensitive. They are less sociable, and more distrustful, and
are more likely to feel excluded by their peers, especially if they are
girls. Boys of financially stressed parents are likely to exhibit low selfesteem, to show behaviour problems in school, and be susceptible to
negative peer pressure and alcohol and drug problems. Financial stress
is related to poorer academic performance in both boys and girls.246

Education and home ownership on the other hand, are associated with supportive
outcomes for individuals, families, and society as a whole.247 These facts make
it hard to deny that broader consumer bankruptcy laws, particularly those that
support education and home ownership, make for a better society.
One of the negative outcomes of indebtedness is shame. Shame is
particularly harmful, individually and collectively.248 The shame of excessive
debt is exacerbated for those who come from disadvantaged groups and who
perhaps feel as if they have no right to credit, however bad, in the first place.249
Thus, reducing bankruptcy shame could help level the playing field for
disenfranchised groups, who bear more of the burden of bad credit, and more of
the shame burden as well.250 Reducing shame could also help every bankruptcy

244

Id. at 600–01.
Pamela Foohey, Debt’s Emotional Encumbrances, in EDWARD EDGAR RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON LAW
AND EMOTION 7–8 (2019); Pamela Foohey, Life in the Sweatbox, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 119, 242–46
(discussing the many emotional consequences of financial failure); id. at 247–49 (discussing why people do not
file for bankruptcy because of shame even when filing for bankruptcy would benefit them).
246
Sousa, supra note 243, at 601.
247
See Richard Green, Do Kids of Homeowners Do Better Than Kids of Renters, 15 CITYSCAPE: A J. OF
POL’Y DEV. AND RES. 223 (2013), https://www.huduser.gov/portal/periodicals/cityscpe/vol15num2/ch17.pdf;
see also Joseph M. Harkness & Sandra J. Newman, Effects of Homeownership on Children: The Role of
Neighborhood Characteristics and Family Income, FRBNY ECON. POL’Y REV. 78, 89 (June 2003) (stating the
obvious, namely that moving is hard on children).
248
Pamela Foohey, Debt’s Emotional Encumbrances in Susan A. Bandes, Jody Lynee Madeira, Kathryn
Temple & Emily Kidd White, EDWARD ELGAR RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON LAW AND EMOTION (forthcoming
2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3471406.
249
See Ian Ayers & Peter Siegelman, Race and Gender Discrimination in Bargaining for a New Car, 85
AM. ECON. REV. 304, 304 (1995); see also Ian Ayers, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail
Car Negotiations, 104 HARV. L. REV. 817–72 (1991).
250
See Rory Van Loo, supra note 231, at 232–33.
245
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debtor and as such make bankruptcy law more relevant and meaningful. Society
is of course made up of individuals so helping debtors one by one is beneficial
individually and collectively.
While poor financial condition causes shame, bankruptcy itself may also
causes shame.251 Knowing this is the case, we can help in two ways. First, we
can make it more worthwhile to endure the shame by taking steps to make more
debts dischargeable and by helping people keep their homes. This is particularly
justified given that human beings and their communities will benefit without
hurting lenders much. We can also make bankruptcy less shame-inducing, by
providing debtors an opportunity to tell their stories, an opportunity to feel that
they have been heard, and a chance to feel that they are not alone. As Professor
Pamela Foohey notes in A New Deal for Debtors: Providing Procedural Justice
in Consumer Bankruptcy, procedural justice helps individuals accept legal
outcomes.252 In bankruptcy, procedural justice can help people make the most
of their “fresh start.”253
All people using the legal system want to be heard, to feel like someone
cares. Some care more about being heard than about winning.254 When we do a
listening exercise in law school classes, some students report feeling that they
are being truly heard to for the first time in their lives. Pamela Foohey provides
extensive data on how much people in the bankruptcy system long to be heard,
and also how providing this opportunity can help alleviate shame.255 Providing
a place to share these stories can help debtors work through their negative
emotions and feel that they are taking control of their financial lives.256
Depending on how this opportunity to be heard was structured, it could also
create an environment in which being forgiven from debt feels more like other
forms of forgiveness.257 It is possible that the section 341 hearing could be used
to share these stories, but a less formal setting might be even better.
I also suggest a return to discharge hearings and I fear that I might be the
only one in the room to recall that bankruptcy courts used to hold hearings on a
debtor’s discharge, before signing the discharge order. While these were quite
pro forma in the past and were done en mass, there is no reason why a court’s
251
See generally Pamela Foohey, A New Deal for Debtors: Providing Procedural Justice in Consumer
Bankruptcy, 60 B.C. L. REV. 2298, 2324–335 (2019).
252
See generally id.
253
See generally id.
254
See generally id.
255
See generally id.
256
See id. at 2331.
257
See id. (explaining that the hearing could acknowledge that the debtors are worthy of forgiveness).
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order forgiving debts, and a hearing accompanying that event, could not be
designed to heal. This hearing could lead to feelings of exoneration, of a return
to wholeness, of a referendum on a person’s return to social standing in
society.258
While Professor Foohey suggests an individual hearing in which each debtor
is questioned by the judge, it may not be necessary to go quite that far. Indeed,
we could simply return to the days in which there were mass discharge hearings,
which were known to be somewhat celebratory. Courts could express gratitude
for our system and for the people who have used it and who have found ways to
rehabilitate themselves financially. This reconstructed vision of a discharge
hearing could make the system more humane. Since this costs the system very
little,259 why not be more humane? What does this really cost us? What does it
cost us not to do this?
CONCLUSION
The changes suggested in this essay are not new, but given the radical
changes we have seen in the debtor-creditor world in the past two decades, these
changes are more necessary than ever. These changes could make the
bankruptcy system more relevant to modern consumers and help make the world
a better place.
For centuries, we have enacted laws to reduce or eliminate bias and outright
discrimination in all segments of society. In the credit world, however, bias and
discriminatory practices persist despite laws forbidding these practices. Persons
of credit continue to take out more costly and more harmful mortgages, student
loans, and other loans than other Americans, even when adjusted for income and
education. We can modify the bankruptcy system to try to level the playing field
and ameliorate some of the harm. At the very least, we can work to ensure that
the bankruptcy system does not create discriminatory results.
As it stands now, the system is broken for all consumers. Fixing it will help
all consumers but will help consumers of color more because they carry less
favorable credit overall. The changes suggested will relieve them of some of this
low-value credit through discharge or modification of loans.

258

See id. at 2332.
This would cost the system very little, particularly if the court no longer had to hear as many student
loan undue hardship claims.
259
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Though we hope the law in general makes the world a better place, it rarely
does so in the abstract. If we are going to have a personal bankruptcy system,
we should make it worth people’s efforts. We should not as a society be okay
with hurting some people without benefiting others. Perhaps we should not be
okay with hurting people at all.
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